Yemen and the Red Sea Shipping Crisis: The Suez Canal, Freight Costs and Egypt

This chapter links two stories: Yemen’s own war since 2014–15, and what happened when it spilled into the sea. From November 2023, attacks by Yemen’s Houthi movement (Ansar Allah) on merchant ships pushed much Asia–Europe shipping around southern Africa. A local war became a global supply shock.

1. Background: how the war began

Yemen’s current war began when Houthi forces took the capital, Sanaa, in September 2014.^[13] In January 2015 they surrounded the president’s residence, and President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi and his ministers resigned.^[13] On 26 March 2015 a Saudi-led coalition intervened to support Hadi’s government.^[53] The coalition also imposed a blockade. Aid ships were allowed in, but most commercial shipping was blocked, according to aid agencies cited at the time.^[14]

The country then split into rival zones. The Houthis held Sanaa and much of the populous north-west. The internationally recognised government (IRG) was based in Aden and the south and east. From 2016 the Central Bank of Yemen was led by governors based in Aden, while a rival central bank continued to operate in Sanaa.^[16][65] This “bifurcated” central bank sits at the heart of Yemen’s economic story.

The Red Sea crisis began on 19 November 2023, when the Houthis seized the car carrier Galaxy Leader.^[17] The Houthis said their attacks on shipping responded to Israel’s war in Gaza.^[17] By July 2025, Reuters reported, the Houthis had targeted more than 100 merchant ships, sunk four and killed at least eight sailors.^[66]

The human cost of the war on land has been very high. The UN estimated that more than 377,000 people died between 2014 and 2021. More than 150,000 of them were killed by violence, and the rest died from indirect causes such as hunger and disease.^[62]

2. Where things stand now

As of October 2026, the conflict has widened again rather than ended. There are three overlapping fronts.

The Red Sea. The May 2025 US–Houthi truce ended US strikes. That campaign hit more than 1,000 targets and cost more than $750 million. The monitoring group Airwars reported 224 civilian deaths.^[71][70] The Houthis then paused attacks after the Gaza ceasefire of October 2025.^[72] In 2026 the threat returned. In July 2026 they declared an embargo on Saudi shipping.^[74] The Africa Center for Strategic Studies counted 12 Houthi attacks or attempted attacks on commercial ships from July to September 2026. In one of them, on 11 August, four sailors died on the Egyptian cargo ship Tihamah.^[18] The Houthis say ships outside their embargo can still pass safely, and container lines have started to come back. Lloyd’s List Intelligence reports that 44 ultra-large container ships passed the strait in 2026, against one in 2025.^[19]

Yemen and Saudi Arabia. In September 2026 Houthi forces took the Red Sea port town of Mokha and moved towards Perim and the Hanish islands near the strait.^[19][61] In early October the Houthis said Saudi Arabia had carried out 106 air strikes in 24 hours. This is a Houthi figure that has not been independently verified. The Yemeni government then announced a “battle of liberation”.^[45] On 5 October, Türkiye and Pakistan activated a mutual defence pact with Saudi Arabia, which had been signed on 7 August.^[44] On 10 October a Houthi strike hit Riyadh’s main airport.^[44]

The Gulf. The wider 2026 Iran war has also shut much of the Strait of Hormuz. Brent crude was again reported above $100 a barrel in early October 2026.^[46][47]

3. The economy before the war

Yemen. Even before 2015, Yemen was poor and dependent on oil. In 2014 its GDP was about $43.2 billion, or roughly $1,430 per person.^[5] In the same year, 48.6% of Yemenis lived below the national poverty line.^[15] Oil was the state’s main source of money. In 2010 the IMF put oil at about 60% of government revenue and over 90% of export revenue.^[63] When Saudi Arabia revoked the residence and work privileges of more than a million Yemenis after the 1990–91 Gulf crisis, forcing most of them to leave, it was a heavy blow.^[64] Inflation was 8.1% in 2014.^[5]

The Red Sea route. Before the crisis the Red Sea corridor carried about 30% of global container traffic and about 12% of global trade.^[18] More than 70 ships a day passed through the Bab el-Mandeb.^[20] In November 2023, 2,068 ships transited the Suez Canal.^[75] In 2023, about 6.9 million barrels a day of crude oil and oil products moved through the Bab el-Mandeb, and 7.9 million through the Suez Canal.^[20]

Egypt. Egypt earned a record $9.4 billion from the canal in fiscal year 2022/23 (July–June) and $10.2 billion in calendar year 2023.^[32] Egypt was already under strain before the crisis. IMF data show average inflation of 24.4% and government debt of 95.9% of GDP in 2023.^[6] (IMF data for Egypt follow its July–June fiscal year.)

4. The economic impact: indicator by indicator

4.1 Output and GDP

Yemen’s economy collapsed in the first year of full-scale war. World Bank data show real GDP fell by 28.0% in 2015. The IMF’s October 2026 database puts the fall at 32%.^[5][6] The two sources use different estimates, and both should be treated as approximate in a country with very weak statistics. In dollar terms, GDP fell from $43.2 billion in 2014 to $21.6 billion in 2018, the last year in the World Bank’s series.^[5] By the World Bank’s estimate, real GDP per person is now 58% below its 2015 level.^[3]

Recent years have brought no recovery. The World Bank estimates that real GDP fell by 1.5% in 2025 and expects a further 0.5% fall in 2026.^[1] The IMF’s figures differ slightly. It records a 0.5% fall in 2025 and projects a 1.5% fall in 2026.^[6]

Egypt slowed but did not fall into recession. IMF data show growth easing from 3.8% in 2023 to 2.4% in 2024, the worst year for the canal, before recovering to 4.4% in 2025.^[6] The IMF projects 5.1% for 2026.^[6] Djibouti, on the other side of the strait, kept growing fast: 6.8% in 2023 and 7.0% in 2024.^[6] Its Doraleh port handles about 90% of the trade of landlocked Ethiopia.^[18] Jordan grew 3.1% in 2023 and 2.6% in 2024.^[6]

4.2 Inflation and the currency: one country, two rials

Yemen’s money is split in two. Banknotes printed by the Aden central bank after 2017 are not accepted as legal tender in Houthi-held areas.^[12] As a result, there are two exchange rates. In Sanaa, where the supply of notes was frozen, the rate stayed stable at about 530 rials per dollar.^[50] In Aden, the government paid for its deficits partly by printing money, and the rial collapsed.^[12]

The Aden rial weakened from 1,540 to 2,065 per dollar over 2024.^[3] In July 2025 it hit an all-time low of 2,905.^[2] The Aden central bank then acted. It suspended 30 exchange companies, capped the rate for buying Saudi riyals and announced that the banking system’s move to Aden was complete.^[10][11] By early August 2025 the rial had recovered to 1,676 per dollar.^[2] On 13 October 2026 it was about 1,576, against 533 in Sanaa.^[9]

Prices followed the currency. Inflation in government-held areas was above 30% in 2024, while Houthi-held areas faced deflation (falling prices) and a shortage of cash.^[3] In June 2025 a basic food basket in government areas cost 26% more than a year earlier.^[2] For Yemen as a whole, the IMF records inflation peaking at 59.8% in 2021, then 26.6% in 2024 and 20.2% in 2025.^[6]

Egypt faced a currency crisis at the same moment as the canal shock. Average inflation was 33.3% in 2024.^[6] It then fell sharply, to 11.9% in January 2026.^[35] It rose again to 14.3% in June 2026, and the IMF expected a temporary rise to 16.7% in the second half of 2026.^[36] Urban inflation was 13.9% in September 2026, down from 14.5% in August.^[37]

4.3 Public finances and debt

The Yemeni government has lost its main tax base. The Houthis have blocked the government’s oil exports, and the World Bank says they were “still blocked” in May 2026.^[1] Government revenue excluding grants fell to just 2.5% of GDP in 2024.^[3] The government cut spending hard, and the deficit narrowed from 7.2% of GDP in 2023 to 2.5% in 2024.^[3] In the first part of 2025, government revenue was 30% lower than a year earlier.^[2] The World Bank’s spring 2026 report gives total revenue of 5.6% of GDP, held down by smaller foreign grants.^[1] A state with so little revenue struggles to pay salaries or run basic services.

Egypt lost a large stream of foreign-currency revenue. President Sisi said on 7 April 2025 that tension in the Red Sea had cost Egypt about $7 billion of canal revenue in 2024.^[34] He also said revenue was down more than 60% on the year.^[33] In calendar terms, revenue fell from $10.2 billion in 2023 to about $4 billion in 2024.^[32] In the year to June 2026 it recovered by 23%, to $4.67 billion, but this is still about half of the 2022/23 record.^[32]

Egypt’s rescue came from abroad. In March 2024 the IMF expanded its Extended Fund Facility (EFF) to $8 billion.^[39] In February 2024 the UAE’s ADQ agreed the $35 billion Ras El-Hekma investment deal, described as the largest foreign direct investment deal in Egypt’s history.^[40][41] In February 2026 the IMF completed its combined fifth and sixth reviews and extended the programme to 15 December 2026.^[35] The seventh review, in summer 2026, released $1.8 billion and brought total payments under Egypt’s two IMF arrangements to $7.3 billion.^[36] Government debt fell from 95.9% of GDP in 2023 to a projected 84.0% in 2026.^[6] Gross reserves rose from $54.9 billion in December 2024 to about $59.2 billion in December 2025.^[35]

4.4 Trade and shipping: the core shock

Traffic. The fall in shipping was fast and large. In the first two months of 2024, trade volume through the Suez Canal was 50% lower than a year earlier. Transits around the Cape of Good Hope were about 74% higher.^[21] UNCTAD reported that by mid-2024 tonnage through the Suez Canal had fallen by 70%, and through the Gulf of Aden by 76%.^[22] Monthly Suez transits fell from 2,068 in November 2023 to about 877 in October 2024.^[75] IMF PortWatch data show daily Bab el-Mandeb transits at about 28 in the week to 6 July 2025, against more than 70 before the war.^[20]

By mid-2026 there was a partial return. In August 2026, 1,232 ships transited the Suez Canal. This was 28% more than a year earlier and the busiest month since December 2023, but still 39% below pre-crisis levels.^[19] Lloyd’s List Intelligence counted 1,166 Bab el-Mandeb transits that month. Its report puts the shortfall against pre-crisis levels at both 70% and 49% in different places, so the exact gap is uncertain.^[19] The Africa Center gives a weekly measure. About 80 vessels a week carried 3.4 million tonnes before October 2023. After the July 2026 attacks this fell to about 25 vessels and 750,000 tonnes a week.^[18]

Oil. Oil flows moved to the long route. Between 2023 and 2024, flows of crude and products through the Bab el-Mandeb fell from 6.9 to 2.5 million barrels a day. Suez flows fell from 7.9 to 3.9 million, and flows around the Cape rose from 6.0 to 8.4 million.^[20] In 2026 Saudi Arabia tried to avoid the blocked Strait of Hormuz by pumping crude west to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, where exports rose from about 1 to 4.9 million barrels a day.^[18] That made the Red Sea more important to world oil supply, not less. It also made the Houthis’ attack on the East-West Pipeline on 10 September 2026 more costly, because the attack halted Yanbu’s crude exports.^[19]

Distance and fuel. A US Defense Intelligence Agency report estimated that avoiding the Red Sea added about 11,000 nautical miles, about ten days and about $1 million in fuel per voyage.^[76] UNCTAD estimated that longer routes raised global demand for container ships, measured in ton-miles, by 12%.^[22] In May 2024, Maersk estimated that the industry had lost 15–20% of its effective capacity on Asia–Europe routes.^[77]

4.5 Freight rates and insurance

Freight rates are the price of moving a container. Drewry’s World Container Index (WCI) averages spot rates on eight major routes. On 30 November 2023 the WCI was $1,382 per 40-foot container, and Shanghai to Rotterdam cost $1,171.^[25] By 18 January 2024 the composite had jumped to $3,777 and Shanghai–Rotterdam to $4,951.^[23] On 18 July 2024 the composite peaked at $5,937, which was 318% above the 2019 average of $1,420. Shanghai–Rotterdam reached $8,267.^[24] UNCTAD found that Shanghai–Europe spot rates rose 256% on average between December 2023 and February 2024.^[78] The Shanghai Containerized Freight Index (SCFI), another widely used benchmark, more than doubled from late 2023 to mid-2024.^[22]

Rates then fell as shipping lines added new ships and adjusted to the longer route. By 9 October 2025 the WCI was down to $1,651, and Asia–Europe rates were close to pre-crisis levels.^[26] In 2026 rates rose again. On 8 January 2026 the composite was $2,557.^[27] On 9 July 2026 the composite reached $4,639, its highest since September 2024.^[28] It was $4,526 on 20 August 2026.^[29] By 24 September 2026 it was $4,468. Shanghai–Rotterdam had fallen to $3,485 as some ships returned to the Suez route.^[30] On 16 September 2026, COSCO’s OOCL Portugal made that carrier’s first southbound Suez transit since the crisis began.^[31]

Insurance. Ships crossing a war zone pay an extra “war-risk” premium on top of normal hull insurance. For Red Sea voyages this rose from about 0.1% to 0.7–1.0% of a ship’s value.^[18] On a ship worth $100 million, that means $700,000–$1 million for one passage, compared with about $100,000 before. Some Israeli-linked ships saw premiums rise by 250%.^[79]

4.6 Labour market

Recent labour-market statistics for Yemen are not available; what is known comes from aid programmes. A World Bank-funded emergency project, which closed in March 2022, gave paid work to more than 443,000 people. Its cash transfers now reach 1.4 million vulnerable households.^[4] The World Bank also reports that remittances, a key income source for Yemeni families, “remain weak”.^[1]

Shipping workers carried direct risk. At least eight sailors had been killed by July 2025.^[66] In 2026 four more died on the Tihamah, and two Yemeni coast guard rescuers were killed.^[18] In Israel, Eilat port’s operator announced in March 2024 that it planned to lay off half its staff.^[82]

4.7 Poverty, hunger and human capital

Yemen is one of the world’s largest humanitarian emergencies. In 2026, 22.3 million people need aid and protection, including 5.2 million internally displaced people.^[8] 18.3 million are acutely food insecure, and more than 2.2 million children under five are acutely malnourished.^[8] The World Bank estimates that nearly three-quarters of the population now lives below the poverty line, compared with 48.6% in 2014.^[1][15] More than 60% of households in both government and Houthi areas report not having enough to eat.^[2]

Aid money is falling as needs rise. The 2026 UN appeal asks for $2.16 billion to reach 12 million people.^[7] In 2025 the UN plan was only 28% funded, down from 56.5% in 2024.^[1] Long periods of hunger damage human capital (people’s health and skills) for decades.

4.8 Spillovers to neighbours: Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Djibouti and Africa

Egypt’s tourism helped to offset the canal. Egypt received a record of about 19 million tourists in 2025, 21% more than in 2024.^[38] In the first quarter of 2026, tourism revenue was about $5.1 billion, against $3.8 billion a year earlier. Arrivals then fell about 16% year on year in April 2026 because of the Iran war.^[38] The IMF said in 2026 that record remittances, tourism receipts and recovering canal revenue had lifted Egypt’s reserves.^[36]

Israel’s Eilat port was the clearest single casualty. In December 2023 its chief executive reported an 85% fall in activity.^[42] In July 2024 he told a Knesset committee that the port had had no activity for eight months and asked for state help.^[83][42] Its bank accounts were frozen over unpaid taxes on 17 July 2025, and it shut completely on 20 July 2025.^[84][85]

Jordan was hit mainly through tourism and regional confidence. Its tourism revenue fell 2.3% in 2024 to JD5.13 billion ($7.23 billion), and visitor numbers fell 3.9%.^[43]

Djibouti and the Horn of Africa. Djibouti’s economy grew strongly through the crisis, as noted above.^[6] But the wider region is exposed. Africa imports 98% of its refined oil products. The Africa Center reports that by 2026 fuel in Somalia had risen from $0.60 to $1.50 a litre over a year, and fuel prices in Ethiopia were up 63% since April.^[18]

4.9 Europe–Asia trade and inflation

About 95% of Europe–Asia sea trade normally uses the Red Sea corridor.^[18] European importers therefore felt the shock most. UK exporters surveyed in early 2024 reported container hire costs up 300%.^[80] UNCTAD projected that higher shipping costs would raise global consumer prices by 0.6% by 2025, and by 0.9% in small island developing states.^[22] The IMF noted that longer delivery times hurt firms with small inventories and could distort monthly trade figures.^[21]

Why was the effect on consumer prices fairly small? Freight is usually a small share of the final price of most goods. A container can hold thousands of items, so even a rise of, say, $4,000 in its shipping cost adds only a small amount to each one.

4.10 Energy

Tankers could avoid the Red Sea by sailing around the Cape, as the oil-flow figures above show.^[20] The largest oil price shock came with the 2026 Iran war, which disrupted the Strait of Hormuz.^[46] Brent spot crude was $71.32 a barrel on 27 February 2026, rose above $100 in March, and was above $100 again in early October.^[47] The IMF’s July 2026 update assumed an average 2026 Brent price of $89.^[48] In April 2026 the IMF cut its 2026 growth forecast for the Middle East and North Africa from 3.9% to 1.1%, mainly because of the Iran war.^[49]

5. What went well and what went wrong

What went well

• Global shipping adapted. Shipping lines rerouted rather than stopping. After the 2024 peak, the WCI fell back near pre-crisis levels by October 2025 as capacity adjusted.^[26]
• Egypt’s external rescue worked in the short run. The enlarged IMF programme, the Ras El-Hekma deal and growth in tourism and remittances rebuilt reserves to about $59.2 billion by December 2025.^[35][40] Inflation fell from a 2024 average of 33.3% to 11.9% in January 2026.^[6][35]
• Yemen’s Aden central bank stabilised the rial. Tighter rules on exchange companies helped the rial recover from 2,905 to 1,676 per dollar within weeks in mid-2025, and it was still about 1,576 in October 2026.^[2][10][9]
• Diplomacy reduced risk at times. The May 2025 US–Houthi truce and the Houthi pause after October 2025 were followed by a partial return of shipping in 2026.^[71][72][19]

What went wrong

• Military action did not restore normal traffic. The 2025 US campaign cost more than $750 million, and Bab el-Mandeb traffic remained far below normal.^[71][20]
• Yemen’s monetary split deepened. Two currencies and two central banks make trade between regions costly. The Sanaa authorities issued new coins in 2024 and a 200-rial note in July 2025, which the Aden bank called illegal.^[51][52]
• The Yemeni state lost its revenue. With oil exports blocked, revenue excluding grants fell to 2.5% of GDP in 2024.^[3]
• Aid funding collapsed. The UN plan was only 28% funded in 2025, as hunger rose.^[1]
• Egypt stayed dependent on one fragile income source. Canal revenue in 2025/26 was still about half of its 2022/23 peak.^[32] The IMF said in 2026 that structural reform progress was uneven.^[36]

6. The economics behind it

6.1 A supply shock to world trade. Shipping is an input into almost everything that is traded. When a route closes, ships must sail further, so each ship makes fewer trips a year. The effective supply of shipping falls even though no ship has been destroyed. Short-run demand for shipping is price-inelastic, so a small fall in supply causes a large rise in price. This explains why freight rates roughly quadrupled within eight months.^[25][24] In the longer run, supply becomes more elastic. New ships are delivered, routes are redesigned and rates fall back.^[26]

6.2 Cost-push inflation (AD/AS). Higher transport and insurance costs raise the costs of firms in importing countries. In the AD/AS model, short-run aggregate supply (SRAS) shifts left. The price level rises and real output falls slightly. UNCTAD’s estimate of 0.6% on global consumer prices suggests a moderate effect.^[22]

6.3 Derived demand and Egypt’s current account. The demand for Suez Canal transits is a derived demand: it depends on the demand for trade between Asia and Europe and on how safe the route is. Canal fees are an export of services for Egypt (sometimes called an “invisible” export). When ships stopped coming, Egypt lost foreign currency. That widens the current account deficit and puts pressure on the exchange rate. IMF data show Egypt’s current account deficit widening from 1.2% of GDP in 2023 to 5.4% in 2024.^[6] A weaker currency raises import prices and inflation.

6.4 Risk premiums and externalities. War-risk insurance is a price for risk. When the probability of attack rises, insurers charge more. This helps explain the partial return of ships in 2026, when the Houthis’ declared embargo focused on Saudi shipping.^[19] The attacks also create a negative externality. The cost falls on third parties (exporters, consumers and Egypt) who are not part of the conflict.

6.5 War finance and monetary fragmentation in Yemen. A government with no tax base and no access to borrowing can only finance itself by printing money. This is the inflation tax: as prices rise, the real value of people’s cash falls, and the state gains spending power. The Aden government’s money printing explains the collapse of its rial. The Sanaa authorities froze their stock of notes, which kept their rate stable but caused a shortage of cash.^[12][51][3] Two monetary systems in one country raise transaction costs and split markets.

6.6 The production possibility curve (PPC). War shifts Yemen’s PPC inward. Capital is destroyed, workers are killed or displaced, and oil cannot be exported. A real GDP per person that is 58% below its 2015 level shows how large this shift has been.^[3] The opportunity cost is large: resources used to fight cannot build schools, roads or power plants.

6.7 Trade diversion and winners. A shock to one route creates winners as well as losers. Ports and services along the Cape route gained traffic, as arrivals around the Cape of Good Hope rose 89% by mid-2024.^[22] Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea port of Yanbu gained when Hormuz closed.^[18] In theory, shipowners can also gain when freight rates rise faster than their costs.

7. Outlook and the way forward

As of October 2026 the outlook depends on three things: the Yemeni war on land, the Houthi–Saudi conflict at sea, and the US–Iran confrontation in the Gulf.

Scenario 1: a renewed truce. If a Saudi–Houthi deal ended the July 2026 embargo and the wider Iran conflict calmed, Suez traffic could keep recovering from its August 2026 level of 1,232 transits.^[19] Freight rates would probably fall further as shorter routes free up ship capacity, as Drewry expected in September 2026.^[30] Egypt would gain foreign currency just as its IMF programme ends in December 2026.^[35] For Yemen, the World Bank estimates that peace could allow growth averaging about 5% a year over 15 years.^[3]

Scenario 2: a long standoff. Selective attacks continue, mainly on Saudi-linked ships, while other carriers slowly return. This is roughly the situation in late 2026. In this case Egypt’s canal income stays well below its peak and Yemen’s economy keeps shrinking. The World Bank and IMF both project further contraction in 2026.^[1][6]

Scenario 3: escalation. The Houthi advance near the strait, attacks on Saudi infrastructure and the strike on Riyadh’s airport raise the risk of a wider war.^[19][44] If both Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb were closed for long, oil and freight prices would rise sharply again, and food prices in the Horn of Africa would climb further.^[18]

The way forward. No published estimate of Yemen’s total reconstruction cost was found for this chapter, so none is given here. The policy priorities are clearer. They are: reuniting the central bank and the currency; restarting oil exports so the state has revenue; restoring humanitarian funding; and agreeing on security for shipping. For Egypt, the lesson is to depend less on a single chokepoint income.

8. Exam-style questions

Glossary

• Chokepoint: a narrow sea passage that a large share of trade must use, such as the Bab el-Mandeb or the Strait of Hormuz.
• Freight rate: the price charged to carry cargo, often quoted per 40-foot container (FEU).
• War-risk premium: an extra insurance charge for voyages through conflict zones, quoted as a percentage of the ship’s value.
• Ton-mile: one tonne of cargo carried one mile; it measures how much shipping capacity is used.
• Derived demand: demand for something (such as canal transits) that depends on demand for something else (trade).
• Cost-push inflation: a rise in the price level caused by higher production costs, shown by a leftward shift of SRAS.
• Current account: a record of a country’s trade in goods and services, income and transfers with the rest of the world.
• Monetary fragmentation: a situation in which one country has two or more separate currencies or central banks.
• Inflation tax: the loss of purchasing power of money holdings when a government finances itself by printing money.
• Extended Fund Facility (EFF): an IMF loan for countries with deep balance-of-payments problems, tied to multi-year reforms.

References

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2. World Bank (2025). “Economic Hardship Deepens in Yemen” (Yemen Economic Monitor, Fall 2025). Press release, 17 November 2025. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/11/17/economic-hardship-deepens-in-yemen
3. World Bank (2025). “Economic Fragmentation and External Shocks Hamper Yemen’s Recovery Path” (Yemen Economic Monitor, Spring 2025). Press release, 2 June 2025. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/06/02/economic-fragmentation-and-external-shocks-hamper-yemen-s-recovery-path
4. World Bank (2026). “Yemen: Overview”. Country page, accessed 14 October 2026. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/overview
5. World Bank (2026). World Development Indicators: Yemen, GDP (current US$), GDP growth, GDP per capita, inflation. API, last updated 8 October 2026. https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/YEM/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?format=json
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13. Al Jazeera (2015). “Yemen president quits amid worsening crisis” (with AP reporting). 22 January 2015. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/1/22/yemen-president-quits-amid-worsening-crisis
14. Borger, J. (2015). “Saudi-led naval blockade leaves 20m Yemenis facing humanitarian disaster”. The Guardian, 5 June 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/05/saudi-led-naval-blockade-worsens-yemen-humanitarian-disaster
15. World Bank (2026). “Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of population) – Yemen, Rep. (SI.POV.NAHC)”. World Development Indicators, updated 8 October 2026 (value for 2014: 48.6%). https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/YEM/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC?format=json
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