Sudan’s Civil War, 2023 Onwards: Economic Collapse and Famine

1. Background: how the war began

Sudan’s war is a fight between two armed forces that were once partners in power: the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti”. The RSF grew out of the Janjaweed militia and was formally created in 2013.^[14] When fighting broke out, the SAF had up to 200,000 personnel and the RSF about 100,000.^[14]

Economic causes run through the political story. When South Sudan became independent in 2011, Sudan lost most of its oil. Oil had provided about 50% of government revenue and 95% of exports.^[3] The World Bank says the split cost Sudan about three-quarters of its oil output.^[2] Protests over prices and fuel followed in 2013, and demonstrations in 2018 led to the removal of President Omar al-Bashir. A transitional government was formed in 2019.^[3][14]

In 2021 the SAF and RSF jointly carried out a coup against the civilian prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok. A power struggle between their two leaders followed.^[14] After the coup on 25 October 2021, the World Bank froze $1.8 billion in grants. About $50 billion of debt relief that Western countries and international lenders had planned was also suspended.^[57] Sudan lost access to the external finance it needed just as its economy was weakest. War began on 15 April 2023.^[11]

2. Where things stand now

As of October 2026, Sudan is split roughly along a north–south line. The Conversation reported in December 2025 that the SAF held a little over half of the country. This included Khartoum, Port Sudan on the Red Sea and most of the border with Egypt. The RSF held most of Darfur, most oil fields and many goldfields.^[14] A September 2026 analysis describes the same pattern. The SAF controls much of the north, centre and east, and the RSF holds large areas in the west.^[20]

Khartoum. The army retook the Republican Palace on 21 March 2025, nearly two years into the war.^[12] IOM, the UN migration agency, links the recapture of Khartoum, Sennar and Al Jazirah to large-scale returns. By June 2026 more than 2.1 million people had returned to Khartoum.^[25]

El Fasher. The RSF took El Fasher, capital of North Darfur, on 26 October 2025, ending an 18-month siege.^[11] Death toll reports from the first days differ by source. The SAF said about 2,000 people were killed. The Sudan Doctors Network said at least 1,500.^[11] AFP later reported that more than 6,000 people were reportedly killed in the first three days, and that the UN said the attack bore “the hallmarks of genocide”.^[24] By 21 December 2025, IOM had counted 107,294 people who had fled El Fasher and nearby villages.^[13]

Kordofan and Blue Nile. The front line has moved east into Kordofan. El Obeid, with about half a million residents, links army-held central Sudan with RSF-held Darfur. It hosts an air base, a key oil pipeline and a major gum arabic market.^[24] In June 2026 RSF drones struck the city’s fuel stations and storage for days, and Sudan Tribune’s military sources reported RSF reinforcements massing around it.^[60][61] ACLED, a conflict-monitoring group, reported in August 2026 that SAF offensives had broken an RSF encirclement of the city.^[10] In September 2026 the army described a new counter-offensive as its largest in the area in months.^[21] RSF drone strikes on El Obeid continued, and at least six civilians were wounded on 9 October 2026.^[22] In Blue Nile, near Ethiopia, the RSF and allied SPLM-N fighters said they seized two army bases in August 2026. Reuters could not verify the claim.^[23]

Talks. No truce has been agreed by both sides. The Quad roadmap of 12 September 2025 proposed a three-month humanitarian truce, then a ceasefire, then a political process.^[18] The RSF said it accepted the plan. Burhan rejected the proposals, saying they would let the RSF keep the territory it had seized.^[15] In February 2026, US adviser Massad Boulos said the Quad had reached a peace document acceptable to both parties. In the same month the UAE pledged $500 million to a UN humanitarian fund.^[18] On 23 September 2026 the Quad and the “Quintet” (a second group of mediators) met jointly in New York for the first time. They called for a truce but announced no agreement and set no date for talks. Asharq Al-Awsat reports that the main sticking point is RSF withdrawal from the cities it holds. The army demands the RSF leave all of them.^[19]

Human cost. Estimates of deaths vary widely. ACLED estimated 27,000 civilians killed by October 2025.^[13] The UN gave an overall estimate of about 40,000 deaths.^[11] The Conversation reported more than 150,000 people killed.^[14]

3. The economy before the war

Sudan entered the war already in deep trouble. IMF data show real GDP shrinking in 2018 (−2.3%), 2019 (−2.5%), 2020 (−3.6%) and 2022 (−2.5%), with growth of only 0.5% in 2021.^[1] In 2022 the economy was worth about $33.5 billion, or about $717 per person.^[1]

Inflation was very high. The IMF puts average inflation at 163.3% in 2020, 359.1% in 2021 and 138.8% in 2022.^[1] The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) recorded a peak annual rate of 422% in July 2021.^[41] Before the war, energy subsidies alone cost more than the government’s entire budget revenue, according to the World Bank.^[2] Sudan also had more than $60 billion of foreign debts in arrears. Arrears are payments that are overdue.^[2]

Agriculture was the backbone of the economy. In 2023 it made up about 35% of GDP and 40% of employment.^[2] Gold had become the main export. In 2022 it made up 46.3% of non-oil exports, worth $2.02 billion.^[54] Government revenue was about 10% of GDP in 2022, which is very low by international standards. Unemployment was 32%, and 33% of people lived in extreme poverty (under $2.15 a day).^[2]

4. The economic impact: indicator by indicator

4.1 Output and GDP

The war caused a very deep collapse in output. The two main international sources agree on the scale but not the timing:

• The IMF’s October 2026 World Economic Outlook estimates real GDP growth of −23.5% in 2023, −19.3% in 2024 and 0% in 2025. It projects +7% in 2026.^[1]
• The World Bank’s Sudan Economic Update (May 2025) estimates −29.4% in 2023 and −13.5% in 2024.^[2] Its country page later revised 2024 to −14% and estimated a rebound of 3.1% in 2025. It credits the rebound to a low base and to people returning to central and northern states.^[3]

On the IMF figures, the economy in 2025 was only about 62% of its 2022 size. A recovery of 7% in 2026 would still leave output about a third below its pre-war level.^[1] Services were hit hardest. The World Bank estimates services output fell 43.2% in 2023, industry 25.8% and agriculture 14.9%.^[2] Night-time light in Khartoum, which economists use to track activity where data are missing, fell by nearly 64% between April and December 2023 compared with before the conflict.^[2]

4.2 Inflation and the Sudanese pound

Inflation is the rate at which the general price level rises. Sudan’s inflation surged again after the war began. The IMF estimates average inflation of 66.6% in 2023, 176.9% in 2024 and 99.9% in 2025.^[1] The World Bank puts 2024 inflation at 170%.^[2]

Monthly CBS data then show a long fall. Annual inflation was 173.3% in March 2025 and 156.3% in April 2025.^[39][40] It fell to 78.4% in July 2025, which the bureau called the first double-digit reading in years.^[41] It rose briefly to 81% in August, then eased to 74% in November.^[42][44] It reached 68% in December 2025, 60.3% in January 2026 and 44.5% in May 2026.^[45][47] This trend reversed briefly in April 2026, when inflation rose to 45.8%. The bureau blamed the depreciation of the pound.^[46] These numbers come with gaps. The bureau has had to estimate prices for North and Central Darfur because insecurity stopped data collection there.^[43] Food and drink make up 52.9% of the household spending basket, so food price rises hit households hard.^[39]

The currency. Sudan has several exchange rates at once: an official bank rate, a “customs” rate used to calculate import duties, and a parallel market rate, the price of dollars on the street. In December 2024 the World Bank put the official rate at 1,994 pounds per dollar and the parallel rate at 2,550.^[2] The pound then fell much further in 2026:

• Late June 2026: the street rate swung between 5,300 and 5,800 in one day after news that the central bank was supplying dollars to banks.^[32]
• Early August 2026: past 6,000 per dollar. The customs dollar rate was raised from 3,740 to 3,960.^[34]
• Late August 2026: the central bank let commercial banks set their own rates as part of a “managed float”. The pound hit a record low of 6,400, and 6,500 a few days later.^[35][36] A managed float means the market mostly sets the rate, but the central bank can step in.
• Mid-September 2026: 8,400 per dollar on the street, against 4,200 at Bank of Khartoum and 3,750 at Omdurman National Bank.^[31] The pound recovered to 7,300 by 20 September.^[38]

Dabanga, a Sudanese news outlet, links part of the slide to the government buying dollars on the parallel market to pay for weapons, military equipment and fuel. It also quotes an economist who says exports are now only about a third of imports.^[31] Traders warned in September 2026 that the pound could reach 10,000 without action.^[37]

4.3 Public finances and debt

Government revenue collapsed. On World Bank figures it fell from 10% of GDP in 2022 to 4.8% in 2023 and 4.7% in 2024. The budget deficit widened from 1.7% to 4.1% of GDP.^[2] Its later country page says revenue stayed below 5% of GDP in 2024–25.^[3] The IMF’s October 2026 data show a fiscal deficit of 3.5% of GDP in 2024 and a projected 3.9% in 2026.^[1]

Debt figures are very uncertain, and the sources disagree. The World Bank estimated public debt at 183.6% of GDP in 2022, falling to 147.4% in 2024.^[2] The IMF puts gross government debt at 189% in 2022, 282.3% in 2024 and a projected 334.4% in 2026.^[1] The difference largely comes from how a falling currency and a shrinking economy are treated. Foreign debt in dollars becomes much larger when measured in pounds, while nominal GDP in pounds is pushed up by inflation. Sudan’s external debt reached $66.8 billion in late 2023. The central bank estimates the principal (excluding interest) at $33 billion.^[57] In April 2026 the government said it wanted to restore its partnership with the World Bank for reconstruction and debt relief.^[57]

4.4 Trade and key sectors: gold, oil and farming

Gold. Gold has become Sudan’s main source of foreign currency, and both sides draw money from it. The state-owned Sudanese Mineral Resources Company (SMRC) reported output of 64 tonnes in 2024, up from 41.8 tonnes in 2022.^[49] It reported about 70 tonnes in 2025, the highest in five years.^[52] These official figures exclude mines in areas held by the RSF and other armed groups.^[50] Artisanal (small-scale, informal) mining employs about two million people and produces most of the gold.^[50]

Most gold does not pass through official channels. The central bank recorded 2025 exports of 14.7 tonnes, earning $1.536 billion. Gold made up more than 58% of total exports.^[53] Technical estimates cited by Sudan Tribune suggest 48–60% of production is smuggled.^[53] The Sudan Gold Exporters Association says production is worth over $6 billion a year, against official exports of no more than $2 billion.^[54]

Policy has been unstable. On 15 September 2025 the central bank banned private gold exports. It reversed the ban in November 2025, letting companies export again at international prices.^[51] In 2026 the government set up dedicated courts for gold smuggling and barred military and paramilitary forces from mining areas. The minerals minister said official exports in six months had matched the whole of 2025.^[55] The RSF also earns from gold. According to AFP, former engineers estimate that Al-Junaid, a company linked to the RSF, earns at least $1 billion a year in wartime.^[48]

Oil and the pipeline. Sudan’s own oil output has been small since 2011.^[2] But Sudan is still important for oil because South Sudan’s crude passes through Sudan’s pipeline system to be exported. This earns revenue for Juba (South Sudan’s capital) and foreign currency for Sudan’s rival authorities.^[20] The World Bank says the war damaged pipelines and oil facilities.^[2] South Sudan has paid a heavy price. In March 2025 the World Bank said disruption to its oil production was costing about $7 million a day in lost export revenue. It projected a 30% fall in South Sudan’s GDP in 2024/25.^[58] On 8 December 2025 the RSF claimed the Heglig oil field, and China began withdrawing from Sudan’s oil sector. On 11 December, South Sudanese forces moved into Heglig under a three-way deal to neutralise the area.^[13] Reports of an oil revenue split between the RSF and the government have not been confirmed in detail.^[20]

Agriculture. Farming has suffered from fighting, displacement, looting and high input costs. FAO estimated 2023 cereal output at about 4.1 million tonnes, 46% below 2022.^[8] The 2025 harvest was about 5.2 million tonnes, 22% below 2024 and 19% below the five-year average.^[7] Sudan needs about 2.8 million tonnes of cereal imports in 2026, mostly wheat, and FAO doubts it can pay for them.^[7] Prices are rising fast. Between January and August 2026 sorghum prices more than doubled in most monitored markets, and diesel almost doubled between March and August.^[7] In 2026 drought added to the damage. FAO data show severe drought on up to 70% of cultivated land in El Gedaref, a key grain state.^[9]

4.5 Labour market

Jobs vanished as factories, shops and offices closed. The World Bank estimates unemployment rose from 32% in 2022 to 46% in 2023 and 47% in 2024. The share of workers in full-time wage jobs fell from 33% to 16%.^[2] The IMF’s figures are higher: 49.4% in 2023, 60.2% in 2024 and 61.2% in 2025.^[1] Artisanal gold mining alone employs about two million people.^[50]

4.6 Poverty, famine and human capital

Poverty. The World Bank’s 2025 report estimates extreme poverty rose from 33% in 2022 to 59% in 2023 and 71% in 2024.^[2][5] Its country pages give different numbers: 23% in 2022 rising to 59% in 2024, and 48% in 2023 rising to 59% in 2025.^[3][4] The baselines differ, but every series shows poverty at least doubling. The UN estimates that nearly 7 million people were pushed into extreme poverty in 2023 alone.^[57]

Famine. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is a five-phase scale for food crises, from Phase 1 (minimal) to Phase 5 (famine or catastrophe). A Famine Review Committee (FRC) of independent experts checks whether famine thresholds have been passed. On 4 November 2025 the FRC confirmed that famine thresholds for food consumption, acute malnutrition and deaths had been passed in El Fasher and Kadugli. Screening found acute malnutrition rates of 38–75% in El Fasher and 29% in Kadugli. Twenty more areas in Darfur and Kordofan were at risk of famine.^[6]

The same analysis found 21.2 million people (45% of the population) in Phase 3 or worse in September 2025. That was 3.4 million fewer than in the previous analysis, because hunger eased where fighting had stopped.^[6] FAO reports a projection of 19.5 million people in Phase 3 or worse for February–May 2026. Of these, about 5 million were in Phase 4 (emergency) and 135,000 in Phase 5 (catastrophe). Fourteen areas were at risk of famine under a worst-case scenario.^[7]

Human capital. Human capital means the skills, knowledge and health of the workforce. The health system has been badly damaged. In the hardest-hit areas, 70–80% of health facilities were barely working or closed, according to the World Bank.^[2] The Sudan Doctors Network reported 234 medical workers killed by December 2025.^[13] UNICEF warned of rising cholera, malaria and measles, and said girls risk being pulled out of school.^[6]

4.7 Displacement and refugees

The war has caused displacement on a huge scale. IOM counted a peak of 11,585,384 internally displaced people (IDPs) in January 2025. By June 2026 this had fallen 24% to 8,805,506, as 4,441,570 people returned home.^[25] Most returnees went to Khartoum (2.1 million) and Al Jazirah (1.2 million). Of returning families, 60% found their homes damaged.^[25] Darfur still hosts 64% of IDPs. Tawila in North Darfur alone shelters about 707,000 people.^[25] IOM expects more than 2 million further returns to Khartoum in 2026, but warns that water, power, health facilities and housing there are heavily damaged.^[26]

More than 4 million people have crossed into neighbouring countries.^[26] UNHCR’s February 2026 appeal counted about 4.3 million Sudanese refugees in the region, mostly in Egypt and eastern Chad. Egypt hosted about 1.4 million.^[27] Chad had received 938,127 Sudanese refugees by 26 July 2026.^[28] South Sudan is also a major destination.^[14] These flows put pressure on some of the poorest host economies in the world. UNHCR says funding per refugee has fallen from $11 to $4 a month.^[27]

4.8 Humanitarian funding gaps

Aid has not kept pace with need. Data from OCHA’s Financial Tracking Service show the following:^[29]

The 2026 plan asked for less money than the 2025 plan. Even so, it was only 14% funded in early March 2026.^[30] In December 2025, WFP warned of drastic ration cuts in 2026.^[13] Access is a second problem. The government’s Humanitarian Aid Commission and the RSF’s parallel bodies issue competing permits, which delays aid convoys.^[20]

4.9 External actors and their economic interests

Many foreign states have economic and strategic stakes in Sudan. Several of the claims below are allegations made by one party and are not settled facts. They are given with their sources.

• United Arab Emirates. In 2024 the UAE bought 99% of Sudan’s official gold exports. Its share fell to 56% in 2025, while Egypt’s imports rose twenty-fold, according to central bank data reported by Bloomberg.^[56] Sudan’s government accuses the UAE of giving military aid to the RSF.^[14] The government has objected to the UAE’s place in the Quad for this reason.^[18] In January 2025 the US sanctioned seven UAE-based companies for funding Hemedti.^[14] The UAE sits in the Quad, which called for an end to all external support to the warring parties, and it pledged $500 million to a UN humanitarian fund.^[16][18] These accusations have not been tested in any court.
• Saudi Arabia has led mediation through the Jeddah process.^[17] The army-backed government said in October 2025 that Saudi Arabia planned $50 billion of extra investment, on top of $35 billion already invested.^[14] Prime Minister Kamil Idris proposed a $100 billion investment package to Saudi Arabia.^[13]
• Egypt has supplied warplanes and pilots to the SAF, according to The Conversation. It hosts the largest number of Sudanese refugees.^[14][27]
• Iran is believed to have supplied attack drones to the SAF. Russia has given the government diplomatic and military support.^[14] The Wall Street Journal reported in December 2025 that Sudan had offered Russia a naval base.^[13]
• China began withdrawing from Sudan’s oil sector after the RSF claimed Heglig.^[13] Amnesty International says weapons from China, Russia, Turkey and the UAE have reached both sides despite a UN arms embargo.^[14]
• South Sudan depends on the Sudanese pipeline for its oil exports and so has a direct interest in keeping it working.^[20][58]

A UN panel reported that a network of up to 50 companies linked to the RSF’s gold wealth helped it buy weapons.^[48] Burhan has accused unnamed states of backing the RSF.^[59] The US has sanctioned individuals from both parties.^[16]

5. What went well and what went wrong

What went well (economic-policy perspective)

• Inflation fell from 173% in March 2025 to about 45% by May 2026, though it remains high.^[39][47]
• Where fighting stopped, hunger eased. The number of people in crisis-level hunger fell by 3.4 million between analyses.^[6]
• Returns to Khartoum and Al Jazirah restarted some economic activity. The World Bank linked the 2025 rebound partly to these returns.^[3][25]
• The World Bank kept some aid flowing by working through UN agencies and NGOs instead of the government, including $182 million for health and safety nets approved in January 2025.^[3]
• A wheat project reached more than 170,000 smallholder farmers. Some saw yields rise by up to 70%, and the 2024 summer harvest met more than a fifth of national wheat needs.^[2]
• Tighter controls on gold in 2026 brought more output into formal channels.^[55]

What went wrong

• Most gold, Sudan’s main source of foreign exchange, still leaves the country unofficially. Estimates of smuggling run to 48–60% of output.^[53]
• Gold export policy changed back and forth. A ban on private exports was imposed in September 2025 and reversed in November.^[51]
• Multiple exchange rates persisted. The World Bank says they act as hidden taxes and subsidies on gold, imports and remittances.^[2] The customs rate was raised twice in less than a month in mid-2026.^[33]
• Government purchases of dollars on the street to pay for weapons and fuel reportedly added to the pound’s fall.^[31]
• Revenue below 5% of GDP left the state unable to fund basic services.^[3]
• Local tolls and “security fees” charged by local governments and armed groups raised the cost of moving goods.^[2]
• Sieges cut cities off from food, and famine followed in El Fasher and Kadugli.^[6]
• Aid funding fell to about 40% of needs in 2025.^[29]

6. The economics behind it

The production possibility curve shifts inward. A production possibility curve (PPC) shows the most an economy can produce with its resources. War destroys capital (factories, power stations, irrigation), kills and displaces workers, and blocks trade routes. All of these shrink the economy’s productive capacity. On the IMF’s figures, Sudan’s output fell by about 38% between 2022 and 2025.^[1]

A negative supply shock and stagflation. In the AD/AS (aggregate demand/aggregate supply) model, the war is mainly a large negative supply shock. The short-run aggregate supply curve shifts left because production costs rise and output is disrupted. Fuel is one example: diesel prices almost doubled in five months in 2026.^[7] The result is stagflation, meaning falling output and rising prices at the same time. Sudan’s economy shrank by 19.3% in 2024 while average inflation was 176.9%.^[1]

Exchange-rate pass-through. Sudan imports much of its wheat and fuel, so a weaker pound quickly raises domestic prices. This is called exchange-rate pass-through. The CBS directly blamed the pound’s fall for the rise in inflation in April 2026.^[46]

War finance and the “war economy”. Governments at war pay through taxes, borrowing, foreign help or printing money. With revenue under 5% of GDP and no access to new international lending, Sudan’s options are narrow.^[3][57] Easy-to-loot resources like alluvial gold can pay for both sides’ war efforts. They also create incentives to keep control of territory, which can make peace harder to reach. Economist Kholood Khair described the fight for El Obeid as being “about power, land and money”.^[24]

Famine as a market failure, not only a food shortage. Famine can happen even when food exists somewhere in a country. It happens when people lose the income or access they need to obtain food. In Sudan, sieges blocked supply, jobs disappeared and prices soared. Food costs in El Obeid rose by up to 300% in mid-2026.^[24] Hunger eased where fighting stopped, which shows that conflict, not only crop failure, drives the crisis.^[6]

7. Outlook and the way forward

Growth projections. The IMF projects growth of 7% in 2026 and 15% in 2027.^[1] The World Bank’s 2025 scenarios suggest that even if fighting stops, GDP would return to pre-war levels only by 2031 with strong reforms and debt relief, and by 2038 without them.^[2]

Reconstruction costs. This chapter did not find a full, published damage and needs assessment for Sudan in the sources it used. The World Bank’s 2025 report gives physical indicators instead of a single dollar total.^[2] Any headline reconstruction figure should be treated with care until such an assessment is published.

Three scenarios.

• Truce and stabilisation. A humanitarian truce of the kind the Quad has proposed would let aid and trade move and farmers plant.^[18] Recovery would then depend on reform. The World Bank calls for completing the HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries) debt-relief process, unifying the exchange rate, phasing out energy subsidies with help for poor households, reducing military influence over state firms and reforming land rights.^[2]
• Frozen front lines. If the country stays divided, two economies could take shape: an army-held east and centre built on gold, Port Sudan and returns to Khartoum, and an RSF-held west built on its own resources. Analysts warn that freezing current lines could make fragmentation permanent.^[20]
• Escalation. If fighting spreads to Kordofan and Blue Nile, more famine and displacement are likely. Aid agencies have warned that conditions in El Obeid could come to resemble El Fasher’s.^[24]

Key risks. These include a weak 2026 harvest due to drought, a cereal import bill of about 2.8 million tonnes that Sudan may not be able to pay, a further fall in the pound toward 10,000 per dollar, and continued gaps in aid funding.^{[7][9][37][29]} There is also a risk for South Sudan, whose public finances depend on oil passing through Sudan.^[20][58]

8. Exam-style questions

Glossary

• Arrears: debt payments that are overdue and unpaid.
• Artisanal mining: small-scale, often informal mining using simple tools.
• Exchange-rate pass-through: the extent to which a change in the exchange rate changes domestic prices.
• Famine Review Committee (FRC): independent experts who check whether IPC famine thresholds have been met.
• HIPC: Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative, an international debt-relief programme.
• Human capital: the skills, knowledge and health of the workforce.
• Internally displaced person (IDP): someone forced from home who remains inside their own country.
• IPC: Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, a five-phase scale of food insecurity, where Phase 5 is famine or catastrophe.
• Managed float: an exchange-rate system where the market mostly sets the rate but the central bank can intervene.
• Parallel market: an unofficial market where currency trades at a rate different from the official rate.
• Production possibility curve (PPC): a curve showing the maximum combinations of goods an economy can produce with its resources.
• Stagflation: falling or stagnant output combined with high inflation.

References

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20. Hikmat, F. (2026). “Sudan’s hope – next humanitarian truce: the ceasefire is only half the negotiation” (opinion). Sudan Tribune, 29 September 2026. https://sudantribune.com/?p=319386
21. Sudan Tribune (2026). “Sudan army repels RSF drone strikes on El Obeid, says aircraft downed”. Sudan Tribune, 20 September 2026. https://sudantribune.com/article/319003
22. Sudan Tribune (2026). “Six civilians injured in drone attack on Sudan’s El Obeid, military sources say”. Sudan Tribune, 9 October 2026. https://sudantribune.com/?p=319778
23. Sudan Tribune / Reuters (2026). “RSF says it seized two Sudanese army bases in Blue Nile state”. Sudan Tribune, 28 August 2026. https://sudantribune.com/article/318007
24. AFP (2026). “In Sudan’s Kordofan, a key city reels as paramilitary offensive looms”. AFP via EWN, 29 June 2026. https://www.ewn.co.za/2026/06/29/in-sudans-kordofan-a-key-city-reels-as-paramilitary-offensive-looms
25. Sudan Tribune (2026). “Sudan internal displacement drops to 8.8 million as returns rise, UN says” (reporting IOM DTM data). Sudan Tribune, 15 June 2026. https://sudantribune.com/?p=315106
26. IOM (2026). “4 million returns in Sudan at risk amid fragile conditions, IOM warns”. International Organization for Migration via ReliefWeb, 21 April 2026. https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/4-million-returns-sudan-risk-amid-fragile-conditions-iom-warns
27. Dabanga (2026). “UNHCR: $1.6 bn needed to support 4.3 million Sudanese refugees”. Dabanga, 18 February 2026. https://www.dabangasudan.org/en?p=20128493
28. UNHCR (2026). “Chad: CORE Sudan Emergency Situation (26 July 2026)”. UNHCR Operational Data Portal, 27 July 2026. https://data.unhcr.org/ar/documents/details/123471
29. UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service (2026). “Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan 2023 and Humanitarian Needs and Response Plans 2024, 2025, 2026: requirements and funding” (plan IDs 1123, 1188, 1220, 1514). FTS, accessed 14 October 2026. https://fts.unocha.org/plans/1514/summary
30. Sudan Tribune (2026). “UN official reaches South Kordofan’s Dilling as humanitarian needs spiral”. Sudan Tribune, 4 March 2026. https://sudantribune.com/?p=311341
31. Dabanga (2026). “Sudanese Pound Plunges Despite Government Measures”. Dabanga via AllAfrica, 17 September 2026. https://allafrica.com/stories/202609180001.html
32. Sudan Tribune (2026). “Sudan central bank cash injection sparks parallel currency market turmoil”. Sudan Tribune, 24 June 2026. https://sudantribune.com/?p=315484
33. Sudan Tribune (2026). “Sudan pound plunges to record low as dollar demand surges”. Sudan Tribune, 8 July 2026. https://sudantribune.com/?p=316020
34. Sudan Tribune (2026). “Sudan pound slides past 6,000 per dollar on parallel market as import levy hiked”. Sudan Tribune, 4 August 2026. https://sudantribune.com/?p=317031
35. Sudan Tribune (2026). “Sudanese pound plunges to record low after central bank eases currency rules”. Sudan Tribune, 28 August 2026. https://sudantribune.com/?p=317993
36. Sudan Tribune (2026). “Sudanese pound sinks to record low as local gold prices surge”. Sudan Tribune, 30 August 2026. https://sudantribune.com/?p=318091
37. Sudan Tribune (2026). “Sudan’s pound hits record low past 7,300 per dollar despite black market crackdown”. Sudan Tribune, 5 September 2026. https://sudantribune.com/?p=318391
38. Sudan Tribune (2026). “Sudanese pound firms on black market as gold, food prices ease”. Sudan Tribune, 20 September 2026. https://sudantribune.com/?p=319029
39. Sudan Tribune (2025). “Sudan inflation jumps to 173.30% in March, reversing decline” (Central Bureau of Statistics data). Sudan Tribune, 21 April 2025. https://sudantribune.com/?p=299978
40. Sudan Tribune (2025). “Sudan annual inflation rate falls to 156.32% in April” (Central Bureau of Statistics data). Sudan Tribune, 15 May 2025. https://sudantribune.com/?p=300943
41. Sudan Tribune (2025). “Sudan’s inflation rate drops to double digits for the first time in years” (Central Bureau of Statistics data). Sudan Tribune, 14 August 2025. https://sudantribune.com/?p=303963
42. Sudan Tribune (2025). “Sudan’s annual inflation rate rises again to 81% in August” (Central Bureau of Statistics data). Sudan Tribune, 14 September 2025. https://sudantribune.com/?p=304989
43. Sudan Tribune (2025). “Sudan inflation continues to decline, drops to 77.40% in October” (Central Bureau of Statistics data). Sudan Tribune, 19 November 2025. https://sudantribune.com/?p=307334
44. Sudan Tribune (2025). “Sudan annual inflation slows to 74% in November” (Central Bureau of Statistics data). Sudan Tribune, 18 December 2025. https://sudantribune.com/?p=308379
45. Sudan Tribune (2026). “Sudan annual inflation slows to 60.26% in January” (Central Bureau of Statistics data). Sudan Tribune, 17 February 2026. https://sudantribune.com/?p=310815
46. Sudan Tribune (2026). “Sudan’s inflation rises to 45.84% in April, driven by currency depreciation” (Central Bureau of Statistics data). Sudan Tribune, 18 May 2026. https://sudantribune.com/?p=314060
47. Sudan Tribune (2026). “Sudan annual inflation dips slightly to 44.50% in May” (Central Bureau of Statistics data). Sudan Tribune, 18 June 2026. https://sudantribune.com/?p=315217
48. AFP (2025). “Sudan’s booming wartime gold trade flows through UAE”. AFP via Al-Monitor, 27 March 2025. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/03/sudans-booming-wartime-gold-trade-flows-through-uae
49. Sudan Tribune (2025). “Sudan gold production jumps to 64 tonnes despite ongoing conflict”. Sudan Tribune, 18 July 2025. https://sudantribune.com/?p=302984
50. Sudan Tribune (2025). “Sudan says gold output hits 53 tonnes in nine months”. Sudan Tribune, 12 October 2025. https://sudantribune.com/?p=305960
51. Sudan Tribune (2025). “Sudan’s central bank reverses ban on gold exports by companies”. Sudan Tribune, 5 November 2025. https://sudantribune.com/?p=306843
52. Sudan Tribune (2025). “Sudan produces 70 tonnes of gold in 2025”. Sudan Tribune, 28 December 2025. https://sudantribune.com/?p=308749
53. Sudan Tribune (2026). “Sudan gold prices rise against global trend as new markets open”. Sudan Tribune, 26 March 2026. https://sudantribune.com/?p=312125
54. Xinhua / Associated Press of Pakistan (2025). “Sudan’s gold production reaches 70 tons in 2025” (cites Central Bank of Sudan 2022 data); and Sudan Tribune (2026), “Sudan gold exporters urge govt intervention to secure fuel imports”, 12 April 2026. https://www.app.com.pk/?p=1137557 ; https://sudantribune.com/?p=312721
55. Sudan Tribune (2026). “Sudan official gold exports match 2025 total in six months, minister says”. Sudan Tribune, 9 August 2026. https://sudantribune.com/?p=317205
56. Sidiahmed, O. (2026). “Understanding changing gold exports”. Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker, 23 July 2026. https://sudantransparency.org/understanding-changing-gold-exports/
57. Sudan Tribune (2026). “Sudan seeks to restore World Bank partnership for reconstruction and debt relief”. Sudan Tribune, 18 April 2026. https://sudantribune.com/?p=312963
58. World Bank (2025). “World Bank’s South Sudan Economic Monitor urges swift and sustained reforms to accelerate economic recovery and inclusive growth”. Press release, 13 March 2025. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/03/13/world-banks-afe-south-sudan-economic-monitor-urges-swift-and-sustained-reforms
59. Sudan Tribune (2025). “Sudan’s Burhan vows to defeat RSF, accuses unnamed states of supporting rival group”. Sudan Tribune, 6 November 2025. https://sudantribune.com/article/306857
60. Sudan Tribune (2026). “Sudanese paramilitary forces mass near El Obeid ahead of expected assault”. Sudan Tribune, 15 June 2026. https://sudantribune.com/article/315091
61. Sudan Tribune (2026). “RSF drone strikes target fuel supplies in Sudan’s El Obeid for fifth day”. Sudan Tribune, 14 June 2026. https://sudantribune.com/article/315064
62. Sudan Tribune (2026). “Sudanese army says it downed RSF drone, ambushed fighters in Blue Nile”. Sudan Tribune, 19 September 2026. https://sudantribune.com/article/318983

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