How War Hits an Economy: A Framework and the Indicators to Watch

This is the first of two framework chapters. The other 18 chapters of this book each study one war. This chapter gives you the tools to read them. It sets out the main channels through which war damages an economy, the indicators economists use to track that damage, and the methods they use to put a number on the cost. Chapter 2 then asks the other half of the question: how governments pay for war.

1. Background: how economists came to study war

For most of the twentieth century, economists studied war mainly as a problem of mobilisation: how a state turns factories, workers and savings into weapons. From the 1990s, attention moved to the poorer countries where most wars were now fought. Researchers began to ask how much civil war costs, who bears the cost and why some countries fall back into fighting.

Paul Collier’s work at Oxford and the World Bank was central to this shift. In one early estimate, countries grew about 2.2 percentage points more slowly each year during civil war than in peace. Over a seven-year war, that leaves incomes about 15% lower than they would otherwise have been.^[8] Later work estimated that the typical civil war in a low-income country lasts nearly a decade and costs at least $50 billion, with more than half of that cost falling on neighbouring countries.^[7] Economists often sum up this research with a short phrase: civil war is “development in reverse”. It undoes years of progress in incomes, health and institutions.^[7][9]

2. Where things stand now

As of October 2026, the world is more militarised and more conflict-affected than at any point in the last few decades on several measures.

Conflict. PRIO counted 61 active state-based conflicts in 2024 in 36 countries, the highest number since records begin in 1946. It also recorded 74 non-state conflicts (fighting between armed groups, without a government on either side), with about 17,500 battle-related deaths.^[3]

Military spending. SIPRI estimates world military spending at $2,887 billion in 2025, up 2.9% in real terms and equal to 2.5% of world GDP. European spending rose 14% to $864 billion. Ukraine spent $84.1 billion, equal to 40% of its GDP, and Russia $190 billion, or 7.5% of GDP.^[1] Chart 1 shows the rise since 2015.

Displacement. UNHCR counted 117.8 million forcibly displaced people at the end of 2025: 41.6 million refugees, about 9 million asylum-seekers and 68.7 million people displaced inside their own countries. The total fell for the first time in a decade, mainly because about 14.7 million refugees and internally displaced people returned home during 2025, often to fragile conditions.^[4]

The cost of violence. The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) puts the global economic impact of violence in 2024 at $19.97 trillion in purchasing-power-parity terms, 11.6% of world GDP, or $2,455 per person. Military spending makes up about 45% of this total.^[6]

Active war economies. The case-study chapters cover these in detail. Ukraine’s economy shrank 28.8% in 2022 and has grown modestly since.^[16] Gaza’s GDP fell 83% in 2024, according to UNCTAD.^[20] Sudan’s economy contracted 29.4% in 2023 and 14.0% in 2024, according to World Bank data.^[16] In the Gulf, IMF projections now show 2026 GDP falling by 15.6% in Qatar and 16.7% in Kuwait.^[18] This follows the 2026 conflict involving Iran: as of late September 2026, Iran was linking the resumption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz to conditions for talks with the United States.^[23]

3. The economy before the war: why the baseline matters

You cannot measure what a war costs without first asking: what would have happened without it? Economists call this the counterfactual. The cost of war is the gap between the path the economy actually took and the path it would have taken in peace.

This is harder than it sounds. A country that was already growing fast loses more, relative to its trend, than one that was stagnating. A country that was already in crisis may see a fall in output that the war did not cause. Lebanon, for example, was in deep economic trouble before 2023: its GDP fell 21.4% in 2020, before the 2024 conflict brought a further fall of 7.1%.^[16] Blaming all of Lebanon’s decline on the war would overstate its cost.

So before you analyse any war, collect a pre-war baseline for at least five years. The most useful series are:

• real GDP and GDP per person, and their trend growth rate;
• consumer price inflation and the exchange rate;
• the government’s budget balance and public debt as a share of GDP;
• exports, imports and the current account;
• employment, unemployment and the size of the labour force;
• poverty, school enrolment and health indicators, such as infant mortality.

The pre-war fiscal position matters a great deal, as Chapter 2 shows. A government that enters a war with low debt can borrow more cheaply and for longer. Israel, for example, ran a budget surplus in 2022 and entered the 2023 war with public debt of about 60% of GDP.^[18]

4. The economic impact: channel by channel, indicator by indicator

War affects an economy through several channels at once. The table below links each channel to the indicators that track it. The sub-sections then explain each one, with evidence.

4.1 Output and GDP

GDP is the headline measure. It is also the one most often affected at the start of a war. Chart 3 shows the fall in real GDP in a severe year of war for eight economies. Several lost between a quarter and a half of their output in a single year: Libya in 2011 (-50.3%), Sudan in 2023 (-29.4%), Ukraine in 2022 (-28.8%), Yemen in 2015 (-28.0%) and Syria in 2012 (-26.3%).^[16] Sources do not always agree: the IMF’s estimate for Sudan’s 2023 contraction is 23.5%, smaller than the World Bank figure.^[18]

The broadest historical evidence comes from Federle and co-authors, who study 150 years of wars in 60 countries. In a war of average intensity, output in the country where fighting takes place falls by close to 10%. The capital stock, productivity and stock-market returns also fall sharply. Countries that are not fighting but are linked to the war site by trade or a shared border also suffer.^[12]

4.2 Destruction of physical capital

Physical capital is the stock of buildings, machines and infrastructure an economy uses to produce goods and services. War destroys it directly. Damage assessments by the World Bank, the United Nations and the European Union try to count this loss.

In Ukraine, the fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5), covering February 2022 to December 2025, put direct damage at over $195 billion. About 14% of housing was damaged or destroyed, affecting more than 3 million households. The value of damaged or destroyed energy assets rose by about 21% between the fourth and fifth assessments.^[17] In Gaza, an updated UN, EU and World Bank assessment published in April 2026 put damage at $35.2 billion, with 371,888 housing units destroyed or damaged.^[21]

4.3 Labour, casualties and displacement

War removes workers from production. Some are killed or injured. Others are called up to fight. Many flee. Each reduces the labour force, so the economy can produce less even if no factory is hit.

Mobilisation alone can cause a sharp shock. In Israel, about 300,000 reservists were called up after 7 October 2023, according to CNBC’s reporting.^[24] Israel’s GDP fell at an annualised rate of 21.0% in the fourth quarter of 2023.^[25]

Displacement is the largest labour shock in many wars. At the end of 2025, about 5.2 million Ukrainians were refugees abroad. Sudan had 9.1 million internally displaced people and about 2.8 million refugees.^[4] Chart 4 shows the global rise in refugees and internally displaced people since 2015, using UNHCR data.^[5]

Displacement shifts costs, too. Host countries pay for shelter, schools and health care, although refugees can also add to the host economy’s labour supply. Germany is an example of how large these costs can be: the Kiel Institute finds that EUR 35.9 billion of what Germany reports as aid to Ukraine was in fact spent inside Germany, largely on Ukrainian refugees.^[26]

4.4 Trade and key sectors

War closes ports, borders and shipping lanes. It also brings sanctions. Trade disruption spreads the cost of war well beyond the countries that are fighting.

The Red Sea shows how this works. After attacks on shipping began in late 2023, Egypt’s Suez Canal revenue fell from about $10.2–10.3 billion in 2023 to about $4 billion in 2024.^[22] Egypt was not a party to the fighting, but it bore a large share of the economic cost. This is the neighbour effect that Collier stressed.^[7]

Indicators to watch include monthly exports and imports, the number of ships passing key chokepoints, freight rates and insurance premiums. For economies that depend on one export, such as oil, a single blocked route can cut GDP sharply. This explains the IMF’s projected 2026 contractions in Qatar and Kuwait.^[18]

4.5 Uncertainty, investment and capital flight

Investment is the part of spending most sensitive to fear. A firm will not build a factory that might be bombed, and savers move money abroad. In Israel, fixed investment fell at an annualised rate of about 68% in the fourth quarter of 2023, as residential construction stopped.^[24]

Capital flight can last long after the fighting stops. In a cross-country study, the share of private wealth held abroad rose from 8.6% before conflict to 19.7% by the end of a war, and to 26.1% after a decade of peace.^[8]

Financial markets can measure the effect of uncertainty directly. Abadie and Gardeazabal studied the 1998 ceasefire in the Basque Country. Shares of firms with large Basque operations did relatively better when the truce became credible and relatively worse when it ended.^[13]

4.6 Public finances and military spending

War raises government spending and often shrinks the tax base at the same time. The standard indicator is military spending as a share of GDP, sometimes called the military “burden”. Chart 2 compares 2021 and 2025 for three economies at war, with the United States and the world average for reference.

Ukraine’s military burden rose from about 3.4% of GDP in 2021 to about 39.6% in 2025, Russia’s from 3.6% to 7.5%, and Israel’s from 4.8% to 7.8%.^[2] Higher military spending often persists after wars end. In the cross-country data, military spending rises from about 2.8% of GDP before conflict to 5.0% during war, and stays at about 4.5% in the first post-war decade.^[8] Money spent on soldiers and weapons cannot be spent on schools, roads or health care: this is the opportunity cost of war.

Ukraine’s general government deficit was 15.6% of GDP in 2022 and 17.6% in 2025, and its debt rose from 48.9% of GDP in 2021 to 107.1% in 2025, according to IMF data.^[18] Chapter 2 looks at how such deficits are financed.

4.7 Inflation and the currency

War is usually inflationary. Supply falls because of destruction, blockades and lost workers. Demand rises because of military spending. If the central bank prints money to finance the government, prices rise further. Federle and co-authors find that consumer prices rise by about 20% at the war site in a war of average intensity.^[12]

Ukraine’s average inflation rose from 9.4% in 2021 to 20.2% in 2022. Russia’s rose from 6.7% to 13.7% over the same period.^[18] Ukraine’s hryvnia moved from an average of 27.3 per US dollar in 2021 to 41.7 in 2025.^[19] A weaker currency makes imports dearer and adds to inflation. In Gaza, UNCTAD reported in 2026 that prices had roughly tripled.^[27]

4.8 Poverty, health and human capital

Human capital is the knowledge, skills and health that make people productive. War destroys it in ways GDP figures barely capture. Children miss school; adults lose years of healthy life.

The World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report found that poverty rates were more than 20 percentage points higher, on average, in countries with protracted violence. No low-income fragile or conflict-affected country had achieved a single Millennium Development Goal.^[10] People in fragile and conflict-affected situations were more than twice as likely to be undernourished, and more than three times as likely to be unable to send children to school.^[11]

Health damage lasts. Infant mortality rises about 13% during a five-year civil war and stays about 11% above its baseline in the first five post-war years.^[8] Global burden-of-disease data show the same legacy effect: World Health Organization estimates for 1999 counted 8.44 million disability-adjusted life years (DALYs, a measure of years of healthy life lost) lost directly to ongoing wars, and a further 8.01 million to past civil wars.^[8] The updated Gaza assessment of April 2026 estimated that human development had been set back by 77 years.^[21]

4.9 Institutions and the conflict trap

Institutions are the rules and organisations that shape economic life: courts, tax offices, property rights and the trust that lets people trade. War weakens them, and weak institutions make further war more likely. Collier called this cycle the conflict trap.

The numbers are stark. Civil war typically doubles the risk of further war, and about half of all post-conflict countries relapse into conflict within a decade.^[7] Post-conflict countries also score lower on World Bank policy ratings (an average of 2.52 against 2.75 elsewhere) and on democracy indices.^[8] The World Bank warns that restoring stability can take a generation or more.^[10]

5. Measuring the cost: what works and what goes wrong

There are two broad ways to put a number on the cost of a war.

The accounting method adds up direct and indirect costs. Direct costs are the immediate losses: destroyed buildings, military spending, deaths and injuries. Indirect costs come later or further away: lost output, lost investment, lost schooling, higher prices, costs to neighbours. Damage and needs assessments such as Ukraine’s RDNA use this method. They separate damage (the value of destroyed assets), losses (lost income and higher costs) and needs (what recovery will cost).^[17] The IEP’s global estimate also uses an accounting approach, adding up military spending, internal security, homicide and other categories.^[6] Chart 5 shows its breakdown.

The counterfactual method compares what happened with an estimate of what would have happened without the war. Collier’s growth-gap estimates and Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol’s regressions work this way.^[8] A newer variant is the synthetic control method. Abadie and Gardeazabal built a “synthetic Basque Country” from a weighted mix of other Spanish regions that resembled it before terrorism began. After the 1970s, real Basque GDP per person fell about 10 percentage points below this synthetic region.^[13]

What works well

• Damage assessments are detailed and sector by sector, so governments and donors can plan reconstruction. Ukraine’s RDNA5 separates needs in transport, energy, housing, industry and agriculture (Chart 6).^[17]
• Repeated assessments show how costs grow. Ukraine’s direct damage estimate rose from $176 billion in February 2025 to over $195 billion a year later.^[17]
• Large historical datasets reduce the risk of drawing lessons from one unusual war. The Federle study covers 150 years and 60 countries.^[12]
• Synthetic controls give a transparent, data-based counterfactual.^[13]

What goes wrong

• Data collapse in wartime. The World Bank’s GDP series for Syria stops after 2022 and for Yemen after 2018.^[16]
• Estimates disagree. Sudan’s 2023 contraction is 29.4% in World Bank data but 23.5% in IMF data.^[16][18]
• Accounting methods can double-count. A destroyed factory is a loss of capital and also a loss of future output; adding both overstates the cost.
• Counterfactuals depend on assumptions about trend growth. Small changes in the assumed trend give large changes in the estimated cost.
• Most estimates leave out the value of lives lost and suffering, or treat them separately, because there is no agreed way to price them.
• Costs to neighbours are often excluded. Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol explicitly leave out regional and global costs, even though Collier estimated that more than half the cost of a typical civil war falls on neighbours.^[8][7]

6. The economics behind it

Several core ideas from an introductory economics course explain the patterns above.

Production possibility curve (PPC). The PPC shows the combinations of two goods an economy can produce with its resources. War affects it in two ways. First, the economy moves along the curve towards “guns” and away from “butter”: more military goods, fewer consumer goods. This is opportunity cost. Second, the destruction of capital and the loss of workers shift the whole curve inwards. The economy can now produce less of everything.

Aggregate demand and aggregate supply (AD/AS). War is both a supply shock and a demand shock. Destruction, blockades and lost workers shift short-run aggregate supply (SRAS) to the left. Military spending shifts aggregate demand (AD) to the right. Both push the price level up. The effect on output depends on which shift is larger. At the war site, the supply shock usually dominates, so output falls and prices rise. This matches the 150-year evidence of lower output and about 20% higher prices.^[12] In a country that fights abroad, the demand effect can dominate, so output may rise for a time.

Capital and growth. In simple growth models, output depends on capital, labour and productivity. If war destroys capital but leaves people, skills and institutions in place, the model predicts fast catch-up growth afterwards, because new investment has a high return. The evidence from Vietnam supports this: Miguel and Roland found that US bombing had no robust negative effect on poverty, consumption, infrastructure or literacy in Vietnamese districts by 2002.^[14] But if war destroys human capital and institutions, recovery is slower. Cerra and Saxena find that wars and other negative shocks are not usually followed by recoveries fast enough to make up the lost output.^[15] Economists call this lasting damage hysteresis.

Externalities. War imposes costs on people who are not part of it: neighbours, trading partners and shipping companies. These are negative externalities. Because the parties to a war do not bear these costs, the full social cost of war is larger than the cost to the countries fighting.^[7][12]

The conflict trap. Low income, slow growth and dependence on natural resources raise the risk of civil war. War then lowers income and growth further, which raises the risk of more war.^[7] This is a vicious circle, and it explains why the World Bank argues that conflict is a development issue, not only a security issue.^[9][10]

7. Outlook and the way forward

The research points to three broad recovery paths after a war.

1. Fast catch-up. When human capital and institutions survive, growth can be rapid as capital is rebuilt, as in the Vietnamese district evidence.^[14]
2. Permanent loss. Output returns to growth but never closes the gap with its pre-war trend.^[15]
3. Relapse. Fighting resumes, as happens in about half of post-conflict countries within a decade.^[7]

The scale of reconstruction ahead is large. As of October 2026, the main assessments are:

Ukraine’s largest needs are in transport (over $96 billion), energy (nearly $91 billion) and housing (almost $90 billion). At least $20 billion of needs had been met since February 2022.^[17]

The main risks to watch are:

• Rising military spending worldwide. Eleven straight years of increases mean more resources diverted from civilian uses.^[1]
• Fragile returns. Many of the 14.7 million people who returned home in 2025 did so to fragile conditions where reintegration is very difficult.^[4]
• Spillovers through trade. Chokepoints such as the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz carry the costs of war to economies far from the fighting.^[22][23]
• Data gaps. Without reliable statistics, governments and donors cannot target aid or judge recovery.

For students reading the case studies that follow, the practical lesson is simple. For each war, ask: what was the baseline? Which channels were strongest? Which indicators moved, by how much and compared with what? Who outside the war paid part of the cost? And how was the war financed? That last question is the subject of Chapter 2.

8. Exam-style questions

Glossary

• Counterfactual: what would have happened without the event being studied.
• Direct cost: an immediate loss caused by fighting, such as destroyed buildings or military spending.
• Indirect cost: a later or wider loss, such as lost output, investment or schooling, or costs to neighbours.
• Military burden: military spending as a share of GDP.
• Opportunity cost: the value of the next best alternative given up, such as schools not built because money went to weapons.
• Physical capital: buildings, machines and infrastructure used in production.
• Human capital: the knowledge, skills and health that make people productive.
• Internally displaced person (IDP): someone forced from home who remains inside their own country.
• Capital flight: the movement of savings and investment out of a country, often because of risk.
• Synthetic control: a method that builds a comparison unit from a weighted mix of similar units to estimate a counterfactual.
• Hysteresis: lasting damage to an economy’s output path after a temporary shock.
• Conflict trap: the cycle in which poverty raises the risk of war and war deepens poverty.

References

1. SIPRI (2026). “World Military Expenditure 2025” (fact sheet). Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, April 2026. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Military%20Expenditure%202025.pdf
2. World Bank (2026). “Military expenditure (current US$) and Military expenditure (% of GDP)”, World Development Indicators, series MS.MIL.XPND.CD and MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS (source: SIPRI). Updated 8 October 2026, accessed 14 October 2026. https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/WLD;UKR;RUS;USA;ISR/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?date=2014:2025&format=json
3. Rustad, S. A. (2025). “Conflict Trends: A Global Overview, 1946–2024”. Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 2025. https://www.prio.org/publications/14453
4. UNHCR (2026). “Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2025”. UN Refugee Agency, June 2026. https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2026-06/global-trends-report-2025.pdf
5. UNHCR (2026). “Refugee Data Finder: population figures 2015–2025” (API). Accessed 14 October 2026. https://api.unhcr.org/population/v1/population/?yearFrom=2015&yearTo=2025
6. Institute for Economics and Peace (2025). “What is the economic impact of violence in 2025 to the global economy?” (Global Peace Index 2025 findings). Vision of Humanity, 28 August 2025. https://www.visionofhumanity.org/economic-impact-of-violence/
7. Collier, P. (2004). “Development and Conflict”. Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, 1 October 2004 (UN DESA). https://www.un.org/esa/documents/Development.and.Conflict2.pdf
8. Hoeffler, A. and Reynal-Querol, M. (2003). “Measuring the Costs of Conflict”. Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford / World Bank, March 2003. https://v1.cepa.lk/content_images/publications/documents/1005-S-Hoeffler%20and%20Reynal-Measuring%20the%20Costs%20of%20Conflict.pdf
9. Collier, P., Elliott, V. L., Hegre, H., Hoeffler, A., Reynal-Querol, M. and Sambanis, N. (2003). “Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy”. World Bank. https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/908361468779415791/breaking-the-conflict-trap-civil-war-and-development-policy
10. World Bank (2011). “New World Bank Report Cites Strategies for Breaking Cycles of Political and Criminal Violence” (World Development Report 2011 launch). Press release, 11 April 2011. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2011/04/11/philippines-new-world-bank-report-cites-strategies-breaking-cycles-political-criminal-violence
11. World Bank Group (c. 2013). “Stop Conflict, Reduce Fragility and End Poverty: Doing Things Differently in Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations”. World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Feature%20Story/Stop_Conflict_Reduce_Fragility_End_Poverty.pdf
12. Federle, J., Meier, A., Müller, G. J., Mutschler, W. and Schularick, M. (2026). “The Price of War”. American Economic Review 116(3), March 2026, pp. 791–827. https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.20241355
13. Abadie, A. and Gardeazabal, J. (2001). “The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case-Control Study for the Basque Country”. NBER Working Paper 8478, September 2001 (published in American Economic Review, 2003). https://www.nber.org/papers/w8478
14. Miguel, E. and Roland, G. (2006). “The Long Run Impact of Bombing Vietnam”. NBER Working Paper 11954, January 2006. https://www.nber.org/papers/w11954
15. Cerra, V. and Saxena, S. C. (2007). “Growth dynamics: the myth of economic recovery”. BIS Working Paper No. 226, Bank for International Settlements, 20 March 2007. https://bis.org/publ/work226.htm
16. World Bank (2026). “GDP growth (annual %)”, World Development Indicators, series NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG. Accessed 14 October 2026. https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/UKR;SYR;YEM;SDN;LBN;PSE;IRQ;LBY;AFG;MMR/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?date=2008:2025&format=json
17. World Bank (2026). “Updated Ukraine Recovery and Reconstruction Needs Assessment Released” (RDNA5). Press release, 23 February 2026. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2026/02/23/updated-ukraine-recovery-and-reconstruction-needs-assessment-released
18. IMF (2026). World Economic Outlook database via IMF DataMapper: real GDP growth, inflation, general government gross debt and net lending/borrowing. Accessed 14 October 2026. https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO
19. World Bank (2026). “Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, period average)”, World Development Indicators, series PA.NUS.FCRF. Accessed 14 October 2026. https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/UKR;RUS/indicator/PA.NUS.FCRF?date=2020:2025&format=json
20. UNCTAD (2025). Report on UNCTAD assistance to the Palestinian people (press summary). United Nations, 25 November 2025. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/unctad-report-25nov25
21. AFP (2026). “Gaza war rebuild cost” (updated UN/EU/World Bank Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment). The Defense Post, 20 April 2026. https://thedefensepost.com/2026/04/20/gaza-war-rebuild-cost/
22. Ahram Online (2025). Suez Canal revenues, 2023–2024. Ahram Online, 2025. https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/571808.aspx
23. Gulf News (2026). “Iran sends US 7 conditions for talks, awaits Trump response”. Gulf News, September 2026. https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/iran-sends-us-7-conditions-for-talks-awaits-trump-response-1.500680991
24. CNBC (2024). “Israel’s GDP contracts nearly 20% in fourth quarter amid Gaza war”. CNBC, 20 February 2024. https://www.cnbc.com/2024/02/20/israels-gdp-contracts-nearly-20percent-in-fourth-quarter-amid-gaza-war.html
25. Reuters via Kontan (2024). “Israel Q4 GDP revised to 21% contraction, hit by war with Hamas”. Kontan, 16 April 2024. https://english.kontan.co.id/news/israel-q4-gdp-revised-to-21-contraction-hit-by-war-with-hamas
26. Kiel Institute for the World Economy (2026). “Ukraine Support Tracker” (update of 8 October 2026). https://www.kielinstitut.de/research/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker
27. Qatar News Agency (2026). “UNCTAD warns of severe Palestinian economic collapse”. QNA, 25 September 2026. https://qna.org.qa/en/News-Area/News/2026-9/25/unctad-warns-of-severe-palestinian-economic-collapse

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