Russia and Ukraine, 2022 Onwards: Two War Economies and the Sanctions Test

1. Background: how the war began

This war has two starting points. The first was in 2014. That March the UN General Assembly passed a resolution on the “territorial integrity of Ukraine” after Russia annexed Crimea. The vote was 100 in favour, 11 against and 58 abstentions.^[36] Fighting then broke out in eastern Ukraine, in the Donbas region. A “Package of Measures” to carry out the Minsk agreements was signed in Minsk on 12 February 2015. The UN Security Council endorsed it unanimously in Resolution 2202.^[37] The Minsk process did not produce a lasting settlement.

The economic cost of that first phase was already large. Ukraine’s real GDP fell by 10.0% in 2014 and by a further 9.8% in 2015. Russia’s output shrank by 2.0% in 2015.^[1]

The second starting point was the full-scale Russian invasion on 24 February 2022. The international damage assessments start their count on that date.^[4] In October 2022 the UN General Assembly voted 143 to 5, with 35 abstentions, to reject Russia’s claimed annexation of four Ukrainian regions: Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia.^[38] Russia’s government calls the war a “special military operation”. Its budget papers list support for participants in that operation as a spending priority.^[24]

For economists the war is a case study of two “war economies”, in which the state redirects a large share of output to fighting, and a test of sanctions against a large, resource-rich economy.

2. Where things stand now

As of October 2026 there is no general ceasefire and no peace agreement. The last three-way meeting between Ukraine, Russia and the United States took place in Geneva in February 2026 and ended without a deal. US-led diplomacy then stalled while Washington focused on its conflict with Iran.^[33]

Contacts resumed in September 2026. US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner visited Moscow on 5 September and Kyiv on 6 September. Ukraine’s presidential chief of staff, Kyrylo Budanov, said Kyiv was preparing for trilateral talks to resume in October. The Kremlin said it did not rule this out but would not yet name a time or place.^[33] In sources available to the author by mid-October, no new round had been confirmed.

During the envoys’ visit, Ukraine’s armed forces were ordered to observe a ceasefire on the front line from 5 to 8 September 2026. Under the order, troops could fire only in response to Russian action. It was not known whether Russia would reciprocate.^[34] On 8 September the Kremlin spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, said Russia was “ready to bring about peace” and hoped trilateral talks would resume. He also said that Kyiv’s terms would worsen the longer talks dragged on.^[35]

The main dispute is territorial. Russia claims the parts of Donbas that Ukraine still holds, even though Russian forces have not captured them.^[33] A Kremlin adviser said in September that there was still no “coordinated package” to negotiate from.^[32] Meanwhile both sides continue long-range strikes. Ukrainian drones have hit Russian oil infrastructure, and Russian missiles and drones have hit Ukraine’s power system.^[32][46][3]

3. The economy before the war

Ukraine had a GDP of about US$200 billion in 2021. It grew by 3.4% that year.^[1] Unemployment was 9.9%, and gross general government debt was 48.9% of GDP.^[1] Even before 2022 the economy had serious weaknesses: weak competition, a large informal economy and a heavy state footprint.^[3]

Russia was about nine times larger, with GDP of US$1.83 trillion in 2021 and growth of 5.9% that year.^[1] It was a commodity exporter with low public debt (16.5% of GDP) and a current-account surplus of 6.8% of GDP.^[1] Military spending was already 3.6% of GDP.^[26] Its central bank’s key rate was 9.5% in mid-February 2022.^[16] Part of its reserves, however, sat in Western financial systems. About €210 billion of Bank of Russia assets were later immobilised in the EU alone.^[11]

Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2026^[1]; SIPRI^[26].

4. The economic impact: indicator by indicator

4.1 Output and GDP

Ukraine’s real GDP collapsed by 28.8% in 2022.^[1][3] Growth bounced back to 5.5% in 2023, then slowed to 3.2% in 2024 and 1.8% in 2025, on IMF figures.^[1] Ukraine’s statistics service puts 2024 growth slightly lower, at 2.9%.^[29] By 2025 the economy was still 21% smaller than in 2021, and GDP per person was 10.5% smaller. The gap per person is narrower because the population has shrunk.^[3] The damage assessment blames the slowdown on labour shortages, destroyed infrastructure and attacks on the energy system.^[3]

Forecasts for 2026 differ. The IMF’s October 2026 outlook projects 1.0%.^[1] The World Bank expects 1.2%.^[31] In August 2026 the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) raised its forecast to 1.8%, citing expected external financing for the defence industry.^[29] Real GDP grew by 0.6% year on year in the second quarter of 2026.^[29]

Russia’s output fell by only 1.4% in 2022.^[1] Huge state spending on the war then drove growth of 4.1% in 2023 and 4.9% in 2024.^[1][21] In 2025 growth slowed sharply to 1.0%, according to Rosstat, the Russian statistics agency.^[21] GDP fell by 0.2% year on year in the first quarter of 2026. It recovered to growth of 1.3% in the second quarter, led by consumer spending.^[22] The IMF projects growth of 0.9% for both 2026 and 2027.^[1]

4.2 Inflation, interest rates and currencies

Ukraine. Consumer price inflation rose above 26% by the end of 2022. It fell to just 3.2% in March 2024, rose again to 15.9% in May 2025, then eased to 7.4% in January 2026.^[3] Higher oil prices after the Iran war began pushed it back up to 7.9% in March 2026.^[30] The NBU raised its key policy rate from 10% to 25% in June 2022. It cut the rate step by step to 13% by June 2024, then raised it again to 15.5% in March 2025.^[27] After a cut to 15% in January 2026 it raised the rate to 15.5% in July and 16% in September 2026.^[27]

The NBU’s official hryvnia rate was 28.99 per US dollar on the eve of the invasion. It stood at 36.57 by late July 2022, 42.04 at the end of 2024 and 44.96 on 13 October 2026.^[28] The damage assessment explains the NBU’s dilemma. High interest rates fight inflation but raise the cost of government borrowing. So the NBU has also sold foreign-exchange reserves to slow depreciation. This works only while reserves stay large.^[3]

Russia. In the first days of the war the Bank of Russia more than doubled its key rate, from 9.5% to 20%.^[16] Its official rouble rate went from 75.75 per dollar on 18 February 2022 to 120.38 on 11 March.^[20] The rouble then recovered to 51.16 by the end of June 2022.^[20] That year Russia ran a current-account surplus of 10.4% of GDP, which supported the currency.^[1] That summer the bank cut rates to 7.5%.^[16]

From mid-2023 war spending overheated the economy. The bank raised its rate in steps to 21% from 28 October 2024, its highest level in the period covered here.^[16] Average inflation was 8.4% in 2024 and 8.7% in 2025.^[1] By December 2025, however, annual inflation had fallen to 5.6%.^[25] In June 2026 the bank forecast inflation of 4.5–5.5% for 2026 and a return to its target from 2027.^[19] The bank then cut ten times in a row, from June 2025 to July 2026, bringing the rate to 14%.^[18] In September 2026 it held at 14% for the first time since June 2025. Inflation was 6.3%, and it warned that household and business inflation expectations remained elevated.^[17] The rouble was 78.23 per dollar at the end of 2025 and 83.87 on 14 October 2026.^[20]

4.3 Public finances and debt

Ukraine faces the classic war-finance problem in extreme form. SIPRI estimates that military spending was 39.6% of GDP in 2025, or about 63% of all government spending.^[26] The damage assessment says annual fiscal deficits have been around 25% of GDP, “the largest in the world”.^[3] The IMF’s general government figures are smaller: between 15.6% and 19.3% of GDP each year from 2022 to 2025.^[1] The gap probably reflects different definitions, such as whether foreign grants are counted as government revenue. Either way, Ukraine’s domestic tax base could not pay for the war. Public debt rose from 48.9% of GDP in 2021 to 107.1% in 2025.^[1]

External partners filled the gap. The Kiel Institute’s Ukraine Support Tracker counts about €382 billion of bilateral aid allocated between January 2022 and August 2026. Of this, €185 billion was military, €171 billion financial and €26 billion humanitarian.^[7] Europe has allocated €237 billion and the United States €115 billion. Yet US allocations almost stopped in 2025, falling to €0.5 billion, while Europe’s rose to €73 billion.^[7] Measuring aid is not simple. Kiel finds that only €41.7 billion of the €100 billion Germany reports as aid to Ukraine was bilateral aid. About €35.9 billion was spent inside Germany, largely on Ukrainian refugees.^[8] The European Commission puts total EU support at €224.5 billion as of September 2026.^[12]

The IMF estimates Ukraine’s gross external financing needs at US$136.5 billion for 2026–2029.^[3] Most of 2026 is covered by the EU’s €90 billion Ukraine Support Loan. It splits into €30 billion of budget support and €60 billion for defence industry and procurement, and €45 billion of it is available in 2026.^[9] The World Bank says that securing external financing for 2027 is now the main source of uncertainty.^[31]

Russia finances its war mainly from its own resources. SIPRI estimates military spending at 7.5% of GDP in 2025, up from 3.6% in 2021. That is about US$190 billion, or 19.8% of all government spending.^[26] According to budget documents reviewed by Reuters, the draft budget for 2027 raises military spending to 17.1 trillion roubles (about US$203 billion). That is 27% more than previously planned and the highest since the war began.^[23] The government’s own press release did not mention a military increase.^[24]

The strain on Russia’s budget is growing. Its 2026 federal deficit target was raised to 3.2% of GDP from 1.6%. The forecast for oil and gas revenue was cut to 7.6 trillion roubles from 8.9 trillion.^[23] The government will draw 459 billion roubles, about 11% of the liquid part of the National Wealth Fund (NWF), to cover the deficit.^[23] The NWF is Russia’s oil savings fund. The draft budget plans deficits of about 2% of GDP in each year from 2027 to 2029. Together they come to nearly 16 trillion roubles.^[24] Public debt is still low by international standards. Reuters reports it is projected to rise from 19.9% of GDP in 2026 to 21.7% in 2027, above the 20% level the authorities regard as safe.^[23]

4.4 Trade, sanctions and the energy sector

The EU had adopted 21 sanctions packages against Russia by July 2026.^[11] A central economic measure is aimed at oil. From 5 December 2022 the EU banned seaborne imports of Russian crude. Together with the G7 “Price Cap Coalition”, it also set a cap of US$60 a barrel. Western shipping and insurance firms may carry Russian oil to other countries only if it is sold at or below the cap.^[13] The EU and UK cap has since been lowered and stood at US$44.10 from 1 February 2026.^[14] On 22 October 2025 the United States imposed sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil. It also warned foreign banks that deal with them that they too could face sanctions.^[15]

The sanctions changed where Russian oil goes more than how much leaves. In August 2026 China bought 50% of Russian crude exports and India 37%, while the EU took just 5%.^[14] This pattern is called trade diversion. A “shadow fleet” of tankers outside Western control carried much of the trade. The Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) estimates that sanctioned shadow tankers moved 52% of Russia’s seaborne oil that month.^[14] Russia’s export grade, Urals, averaged US$69.90 in August 2026, well above the cap.^[14]

Russia’s export earnings followed world prices. Its current-account surplus jumped to 10.4% of GDP in 2022 and then fell to 2.4% in 2023.^[1] In 2026 two shocks hit at once. The Iran war raised world oil prices, which the IMF expects to support Russian growth.^[30] At the same time, Ukrainian drone strikes disrupted Russia’s refineries and ports. The International Energy Agency (IEA) reported in September 2026 that Russian product exports had “nearly halted”.^[46] Crude loadings at Novorossiysk fell 58% in August, and Russia imported a record 172,000 tonnes of oil products, mostly petrol.^[14] Russia’s fossil fuel export revenue fell to €604 million a day that month.^[14]

Ukraine’s energy system has been a main target of Russian strikes. The damage assessment estimates direct damage to the energy sector at US$24.8 billion and losses at US$88.2 billion. Recovery needs are US$90.6 billion. Millions of consumers faced long power cuts in late 2025.^[3] Strikes during the harsh winter of 2025–26 knocked out about 9 gigawatts of generating capacity.^[30] UNHCR, the UN refugee agency, found that from October 2025 people leaving Ukraine more often cited a lack of electricity, heating and water.^[6]

Ukraine’s grain exports depend on the Black Sea. Under the UN- and Türkiye-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative, 32.9 million tonnes of food left Ukrainian ports between August 2022 and July 2023. About 57% went to developing countries.^[40] The deal expired on 17 July 2023 and was not renewed.^[39] Disrupted access to Black Sea ports still accounts for about 60% of losses in Ukraine’s transport sector.^[3] Ukraine’s current-account deficit widened to 16% of GDP in 2025, ^[1] The damage assessment notes that high government spending raises demand for imports.^[3]

4.5 Labour market

Labour shortages are central to both economies, though for opposite reasons. In Ukraine the IMF records unemployment rising from 9.9% in 2021 to 24.5% in 2022. It then fell back to 11.6% in 2025.^[1] Yet firms report that a lack of skilled workers is their main constraint on production. The damage assessment calls this a “deep structural mismatch”.^[3] Millions of people have left the country or moved inside it.^[6][3] A government decree at the end of August 2025 allowed men aged 18 to 22 to leave Ukraine. In September and October 2025, males aged 18 to 34 made up 38% of new temporary-protection decisions in the EU.^[6]

In Russia unemployment fell from 4.8% in 2021 to a record low of 2.2% in 2025.^[1] Low unemployment usually signals a healthy economy. In a war economy it can instead signal excess demand for labour, as the army and arms factories compete for a limited pool of workers. Excess demand pushes up wages and prices. The Bank of Russia has repeatedly said that inflation expectations remain elevated.^[17]

4.6 Population, poverty and human capital

The human cost in Ukraine is the deepest and longest-lasting effect. The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission has verified more than 15,000 civilians killed and more than 40,600 injured since February 2022. Real figures are likely higher. In 2025 alone, 2,514 civilians were killed.^[3] About 5.9 million refugees from Ukraine were recorded worldwide at the end of 2025, including close to 5.4 million in Europe. Some 74% are women and children.^[6] Around 4.7 million people are internally displaced.^[3] By December 2025 about 1.4 million refugees had returned and stayed at least three months, but returns are slowing.^[6]

The number of children in Ukraine has fallen by 33%, or about 2.4 million, since January 2022.^[3] This hits human capital, meaning the skills and health of a workforce, for decades to come. Some 14% of the housing stock has been damaged or destroyed, affecting more than three million households.^[2] The damage assessment reports that poverty and inequality are higher than in 2022.^[3] It estimates socio-economic losses at US$666.7 billion. These are losses of output and income, counted on top of physical damage.^[3]

Russian civilians also bear costs, though they are less well documented. Households have faced years of high inflation and very high borrowing costs.^[1][16] In 2026 strikes on refineries forced record imports of petrol.^[14] Military spending took 19.8% of all government spending in 2025, and by definition that share is not available for civilian services.^[26]

4.7 Global effects: food and energy prices

The 2022 invasion also became a supply shock for world food and energy markets. The FAO Food Price Index reached 160.2 in March 2022, its highest monthly level in the series. Its annual average rose to 144.5 in 2022, from 94.9 in 2019.^[41] The IMF’s benchmark wheat price peaked at about US$444 a tonne in May 2022, against US$238 in January 2021.^[44]

Energy prices rose even more. Europe’s benchmark natural gas price averaged US$37.5 per million British thermal units in 2022. That compares with US$4.5 in 2019, and the price peaked at about US$70 in August 2022.^[43] Brent crude averaged US$100.9 a barrel in 2022, up from US$70.9 in 2021.^[42] These shocks fed into inflation and cost-of-living crises far from the front line. In 2026 the Iran war caused a second oil shock. Brent averaged over US$99 a barrel from March to May 2026^[45] and touched US$113.48 on 9 September.^[46]

4.8 Frozen assets and reparations

Freezing Russia’s central bank reserves was a new kind of financial sanction. In the EU, about €210 billion was immobilised after the third sanctions package in February 2022.^[11] The EU has not confiscated the assets themselves. Instead it has used the windfall profits they earn. Since October 2024, 95% of these extraordinary revenues have gone to help Ukraine repay EU and G7 loans of about €45 billion, and 5% to the European Peace Facility.^[11] The G7 Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) loans bring forward about US$50 billion of these future profits.^[7] In December 2025 the Council banned, for now, any transfer of the assets back to Russia.^[11]

The European Council of 18 December 2025 then agreed what is in effect a reparations-linked loan: €90 billion funded by EU borrowing and backed by spare room in the EU budget. Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia were not bound by its guarantee.^[10][9] Ukraine repays only after receiving reparations from Russia. Until then, the Russian central bank’s assets stay immobilised, and the EU keeps the right to use them to repay the loan.^[10] The first €3.2 billion of budget support was paid out in June 2026.^[7]

5. What went well and what went wrong

What went well (economic-policy view)

• Ukraine kept its state and banks working. After the 2022 collapse the economy returned to growth in 2023.^[1] The NBU brought inflation down from over 26% to 3.2% by March 2024.^[3]
• Ukraine mobilised large external finance. Donors allocated about €382 billion by August 2026.^[7] The EU’s €90 billion loan covers much of 2026–27.^[9]
• New industries emerged in Ukraine. The damage assessment notes innovation in high-tech sectors linked to defence. It also notes that capital spending on reconstruction now drives growth.^[3]
• Russia avoided a 2022 financial collapse. A sharp rate rise was followed by a rapid recovery of the rouble, and GDP fell only 1.4% that year.^[16][20][1]
• Russia brought inflation down. Tight monetary policy cut inflation to 5.6% by December 2025.^[25]
• The grain corridor eased world food prices for a time. It moved 32.9 million tonnes, more than half to developing countries.^[40]

What went wrong

• Ukraine’s debt and aid dependence. Debt passed 100% of GDP.^[1] Aid commitments usually cover only one or two years, so financing must be renegotiated again and again.^[3]
• Ukraine’s energy system remains exposed. Repeated attacks caused long outages and pushed up inflation and costs.^[3][30]
• Ukraine is losing people. With 5.9 million refugees and 2.4 million fewer children, future labour supply will be smaller.^[6][3]
• Russia’s economy overheated, then stalled. War spending drove unemployment to 2.2% and rates to 21%, and growth slowed to 1.0% in 2025.^[1][16][21]
• Russia’s budget buffers are thinning. Oil and gas revenue is below plan, the NWF is being drawn down and deficits are planned to 2029.^[23][24]
• The oil price cap leaked. Russian crude sold above the cap through a shadow fleet and was diverted to Asian buyers.^[14]
• The world paid too. Food and energy prices spiked in 2022, and the grain deal ended in July 2023.^[41][43][39]

6. The economics behind it

War finance. A government can pay for a war in four ways: taxes, borrowing at home, borrowing or grants from abroad, and printing money. Ukraine’s tax base shrank just as spending soared. Military spending reached 39.6% of GDP^[26], so it leaned heavily on foreign money. Without that money it would have had to print far more, risking very high inflation. Russia’s larger and less damaged economy let it rely on taxes, oil revenue, domestic borrowing and its savings fund.^[23] This difference explains why Ukraine’s debt ratio more than doubled while Russia’s stayed low.^[1]

Opportunity cost: “guns versus butter”. Every rouble or hryvnia spent on the military is not spent on schools, hospitals or private investment. Military spending was about 63% of Ukraine’s government spending in 2025 and almost 20% of Russia’s.^[26] That gives a measure of the civilian goods each country gives up.

Military Keynesianism and overheating in Russia. Higher government spending raises aggregate demand (AD). When an economy has spare capacity, output rises. Russia grew by 4.1% and 4.9% in 2023 and 2024.^[1] But once workers are fully employed, extra demand mostly raises prices. Russia’s unemployment reached 2.2%, and inflation stayed above target.^[1] The central bank responded with very high rates. These slowed private investment and consumer credit, and growth fell to 1.0% in 2025.^[21]

Sanctions and trade diversion. Sanctions try to cut a target’s revenue or access to inputs. But if other buyers are willing, trade is diverted rather than destroyed. Russia’s oil went to China and India.^[14] A price cap aims to keep oil flowing, so world prices do not spike, while cutting the seller’s profit. Its success depends on enforcement. When Urals trades above the cap and most cargoes travel on shadow tankers, the cap’s bite weakens.^[14] The 2026 strikes on refineries show that physical disruption can cut export volumes faster than financial rules.^[46]

Supply shocks and the world economy. The 2022 jump in food and energy prices was a negative supply shock for importing countries. In AD/AS terms, SRAS shifted left, raising prices and cutting output. That combination is called “stagflation”. This is why the grain corridor mattered: 57% of its cargo went to developing countries.^[40][41]

Human capital and institutions. Long-run growth depends on people and institutions as well as machines. Ukraine has lost children, workers and skills.^[3] On the other hand, EU accession anchors reforms to the rule of law and anti-corruption. The damage assessment sees these reforms as the main path to faster growth.^[3] The €90 billion EU loan is explicitly tied to such conditions.^[9]

7. Outlook and the way forward

Reconstruction costs. The fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5) puts Ukraine’s ten-year recovery and reconstruction needs at almost US$588 billion. That is nearly three times Ukraine’s estimated 2025 GDP. Transport needs over US$96 billion, energy nearly US$91 billion and housing almost US$90 billion.^[2] The estimate keeps rising. It was US$524 billion a year earlier, in RDNA4.^[4] For 2026 the government identified US$15.25 billion of priority recovery needs, of which about 34% was already financed.^[5]

Scenarios for Ukraine. The damage assessment sketches two paths. If fighting continues through 2026, growth stays around 2%. If a ceasefire is in place by the end of 2026, growth could rise to 4% in 2027 and 4.5% in 2028.^[3] In a high-growth scenario, productivity growth would more than triple, net immigration would exceed 3 million and investment would reach 24% of GDP. Income per person could then grow 6% a year, reaching 25% of the EU average within 15 years.^[3] Under the baseline, debt sustainability depends on an eventual debt treatment, meaning relief that reduces the stock of debt.^[3]

Scenarios for Russia. The IMF expects growth of about 0.9% a year in 2026–27.^[1] The budget plans deficits through 2029 and record military spending in 2027.^[24][23] A peace deal would raise hard questions about how to move resources from arms back to civilian production. Continued war means more pressure on the NWF and on taxes. Oil prices are a swing factor: the Iran war raised them, but strikes on Russian energy infrastructure cut volumes.^[30][46]

Key risks.

• A gap in Ukraine’s external financing for 2027 and beyond.^[31]
• Further attacks on energy systems on both sides.^[3][46]
• Renewed inflation in both countries. The NBU raised its rate to 16% in September 2026, and the Bank of Russia paused its cuts.^[27][17]
• Legal and political disputes over the €210 billion of immobilised assets.^[11]
• Failure of the peace talks expected in October 2026.^[33]

8. Exam-style questions

Glossary

• War economy: an economy in which the state redirects a large share of output and labour to military needs.
• Opportunity cost: the value of the next best alternative given up when a choice is made, such as civilian goods given up for military goods.
• Production possibility curve (PPC): a curve showing the maximum combinations of two goods an economy can produce with its resources.
• Key policy rate: the main interest rate set by a central bank to influence borrowing, spending and inflation.
• Sanctions: restrictions on trade or finance imposed by one or more countries to change another country’s behaviour.
• Price cap: a maximum price at which a good may be traded using the services of the countries imposing the cap.
• Shadow fleet: tankers operating outside Western ownership, insurance or regulation, used to move sanctioned oil.
• Immobilised assets: assets that are frozen so their owner cannot use or move them, but which have not been confiscated.
• Human capital: the skills, education and health of a population that determine its productive capacity.
• Stagflation: a combination of rising prices and stagnant or falling output, often caused by a negative supply shock.

References

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