Myanmar Since the 2021 Coup: Conflict, Sanctions and a Shrinking Economy

1. Background: how the war began

On 1 February 2021 Myanmar’s military seized power. It detained the country’s de facto leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, along with President Win Myint and other politicians, and declared a state of emergency.^[1] The coup came on the day the new parliament had been due to meet. The military said there had been fraud in the November 2020 election, which Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) had won. Myanmar’s Union Election Commission had reported that it found no evidence of voter fraud.^[1] The commander-in-chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, took power.^[1]

The military has since struggled to put down armed resistance to its rule, including from ethnic rebel groups in the borderlands.^[17] A turning point came on 27 October 2023. That day the “Brotherhood Alliance” of the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, the Arakan Army and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army launched coordinated attacks across northern Shan State. The campaign became known as Operation 1027.^[17] On its first day the alliance attacked about 12 towns and seized a customs post at Chinshwehaw on the border with China.^[17] Analysts quoted by AFP said the three groups could call on at least 15,000 fighters.^[17]

The economic story starts before the fighting spread. In mid-2021 the World Bank expected an 18% contraction in the year to September 2021. It said the shock, together with COVID-19, would leave the economy about 30% smaller than it would otherwise have been.^[2] Since then, conflict, natural disasters and policy choices have kept output well below its earlier path.

2. Where things stand now

As of October 2026, the civil war continues and Myanmar has a new government led by the former military chief. The election ran in three phases: 28 December 2025, 11 January 2026 and 25 January 2026.^[19] The first two phases covered 202 of the country’s 330 townships.^[18] Many opposition parties were barred, and fighting meant there was no voting in large parts of the country.^[21] Malaysia, which chaired ASEAN in 2025, said the regional bloc would not recognise the results.^[19]

The military-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won more than 80% of the elected seats in the national legislature. An analysis published by Singapore’s ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute puts its share of ballots cast at about 44%.^[20] Only 24.26 million voters were registered, against 38.27 million in 2020, and state media reported that 13.14 million voted.^[20] The 2008 constitution also reserves a quarter of parliamentary seats for the armed forces.^[21] Min Aung Hlaing resigned as commander-in-chief and was elected president by parliament on 3 April 2026.^[21] He was inaugurated on 10 April.^[22]

Diplomatic isolation is easing in some places. Malaysia’s prime minister told Min Aung Hlaing on 8 October 2026 that his government would do “whatever possible” to support Myanmar’s full return to ASEAN. The government in Naypyidaw then held the first meeting of a new ASEAN Affairs Committee on 13 October.^[22] In the United States, DVB reports that the Trump administration has moved away from the post-2021 policy of isolating the military and has opened direct talks. DVB says the aims include curbing cyber-scam operations and gaining access to rare-earth elements.^[25]

The fighting has not stopped. The Arakan Army says it controls 14 of Rakhine State’s 17 townships. In October 2026 the military was mounting a counter-offensive from Magway Region towards Ann township, which the Arakan Army took in 2024.^[23] Airstrikes and clashes with the Kachin Independence Army were also reported in October.^[24] On the economy, the World Bank said in June 2026 that conditions had shown “tentative stabilization”. It added that a fuel price shock linked to the war involving Iran had increased the pressure.^[11][12] Inflation rose to 24.6% in April 2026.^[11] In October 2026 a UNDP survey found that 32.6% of people, almost 18 million, were poor on a multidimensional measure. A further 19.5 million were “vulnerable to poverty”.^[24]

3. The economy before the war

In the late 2010s Myanmar was one of Asia’s faster-growing economies. Real GDP growth was between 5.9% and 6.8% a year in the five fiscal years from 2015/16 to 2019/20.^[13] Inflation averaged 9.1% in FY2019/20.^[9] The official poverty rate was 24.8% in 2017.^[7] Public debt was 42.2% of GDP in FY2019/20.^[9]

Foreign investment had flowed in after political and economic opening. Net inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) reached US$4.8 billion in 2017. They were about US$1.7 billion in 2019.^[15] The kyat traded at an official average of about 1,518 per US dollar in 2019 and 1,382 in 2020.^[16]

The economy also depended heavily on farming. Agriculture employs over a third of the workforce and produces around a quarter of gross value added.^[9] Food- and agro-processing makes up 27% of value added in manufacturing.^[9] So the coup hit an economy that was growing fast, with a large rural population.

4. The economic impact: indicator by indicator

4.1 Output and GDP

Before: growth of 6.6% in FY2019/20.^[9] During: two years of deep contraction, then near-stagnation.

Measuring the collapse is complicated by fiscal-year changes. In 2021 the World Bank reported an expected 18% fall in FY2021, which then ran from October 2020 to September 2021.^[2] Its later reports used an April–March fiscal year. On that basis, real GDP fell 9.0% in FY2020/21 and 12.0% in FY2021/22. It then grew 4.0% in FY2022/23 and 1.0% in FY2023/24, before falling 1.0% in FY2024/25.^[9] The two sets of figures cover different twelve-month periods, so they cannot be compared directly. Both show a very deep fall in output.

The earthquake and continued fighting then pushed output down again. The World Bank estimated a contraction of 2.0% in FY2025/26.^[11] It cut its FY2026/27 forecast from 3% to 2% after the 2026 fuel price shock.^[12] The IMF’s figures follow the same path.^[13] In 2022 the World Bank estimated that GDP was still around 13% below its 2019 level.^[3] In late 2025 it expected the economy to be 13% smaller than before the pandemic.^[9] In other words, there has been almost no recovery for five years.

4.2 Inflation and the currency

Before: inflation of 9.1% (FY2019/20) and an official rate of about 1,382 kyat per dollar in 2020.^[9][16] During: average inflation of 27–30% a year from FY2022/23 to FY2024/25, and a market exchange rate around three times the pre-coup rate.^[9][7]

The kyat began falling straight after the coup. By mid-July 2021 it had lost about 23% against the US dollar since late January.^[2] Inflation followed. It reached 17.3% year-on-year in March 2022 and almost 20% in mid-2022.^[3][4] Annual average inflation was 27.2% in FY2022/23, 27.6% in FY2023/24 and 29.6% in FY2024/25.^[9] Over the year to April 2025, headline inflation was 34.1%. Non-food inflation was 36.4%, driven by transport costs.^[7] Inflation eased to 19.8% in October 2025, then rose again to 24.6% in April 2026 after the fuel price shock.^[9][11]

The authorities responded with controls rather than adjustment. Since 2022 the official reference rate has been held at 2,100 kyat per dollar.^[9] In the first eight months of 2024 the kyat lost about 40% of its value on parallel markets. In August 2024 the gap between the official and parallel rates exceeded 200%.^[6] From October 2024 the parallel rate stabilised at about 4,400 kyat per dollar.^[7] The World Bank credits the stability to central bank dollar sales and tight controls. These included an “Export First Policy” that requires importers to show export earnings before they can get an import licence. They also included bans on parallel-market trading and prosecutions of unlicensed currency traders.^[7] The kyat then gained about 13% against the dollar in the parallel market in the year to October 2025.^[9] In October 2026 DVB converted 10,000 kyat into US$2.22, which implies a rate of about 4,500 kyat per dollar.^[25]

The World Bank says the overvalued official rate “undermines export competitiveness, encourages arbitrage, and contributes to chronic foreign currency shortages”.^[9] It also points to “robust monetary expansion fueled by central bank deficit financing” as a cause of inflation.^[9]

4.3 Public finances and debt

Before: revenue of 22.7% of GDP, a deficit of 6.4% and public debt of 42.2% of GDP in FY2019/20.^[9] During: debt above 60% of GDP, with deficits funded largely by the central bank.^[9]

Revenue collapsed to 16.3% of GDP in FY2020/21. The deficit widened to 7.6% of GDP.^[9] Public debt rose to 54.0% of GDP that year and reached 62.4% in FY2024/25.^[9] In FY2024/25 revenue was 23.1% of GDP and spending 27.2%, a gap of about 4.1% of GDP.^[9] The World Bank forecasts deficits of 4.9% in FY2025/26 and 5.0% in FY2026/27, with debt staying above 60% of GDP.^[9][10] Revenues have been propped up by non-tax income from state economic enterprises.^[9]

How the deficit is financed matters more than its size. Most borrowing comes from the Central Bank of Myanmar, which in effect creates new money. The World Bank warns that this raises “concerns about further inflationary risks and macroeconomic stability”.^[9] Meanwhile, spending on public services has weakened. The World Bank describes “growing fragmentation in service delivery”.^[9]

4.4 Trade, investment and key sectors

Before: FDI net inflows of US$1.7–4.8 billion a year in 2015–2019.^[15] During: inflows of about US$1.1 billion in 2024 and 2025, and trade forced through licensing and border closures.^[15][6]

Trade routes. Fighting has cut the land routes to China and Thailand. In late 2024 six of the eight customs posts on those borders were closed.^[6] In late 2025 key trade routes to both countries were still shut.^[9] Mining exports such as ores, precious stones and rare earths fell by about 40% between October 2024 and March 2025 because of conflict.^[7]

Import compression. Licensing under the Export First Policy squeezed imports to 12% of GDP in FY2024/25, down 5 percentage points. Exports held at 13.3% of GDP.^[9] The result was a merchandise trade surplus of about US$1 billion and a current account surplus of 3.3% of GDP.^[9] This surplus did not come from strong exports. It came from people and firms being unable to buy imported goods. In the six months to March 2025, fertiliser imports fell by 37% in volume, which raised concerns about shortages for the next growing season.^[7] After the earthquake, reconstruction needs pushed merchandise imports up 17% in April–September 2025, and the trade surplus halved to about US$0.67 billion.^[9]

Garments. The garment industry has held up better than expected. Some firms left after US tariff increases, but new entrants, mainly Chinese firms, replaced them. Garment exports rose sharply in 2025.^[9]

Investment. Recorded FDI net inflows fell from US$2.1 billion in 2021 to US$1.1 billion in 2024 and 2025.^[15] New commitments were only about US$249 million in April–September 2025, with Singapore (47%) and China (21%) the largest sources.^[9] The World Bank warned in 2022 that, on the lessons of Myanmar’s economic history, investor confidence and the business environment would weaken further if these trends continued.^[3]

The illicit economy. The World Bank reports that opium cultivation, scam operations and large-scale illicit mining “have increased significantly since 2021”.^[7] According to UNODC data cited by the Bank, poppy cultivation fell by about 30% to 29,500 hectares between 2017 and 2020. It has since risen by 53%.^[7] The opiate economy was worth an estimated US$0.59–1.57 billion a year in 2021–23, or roughly 0.9–2.4% of GDP.^[7]

4.5 Energy and electricity

Before: power shortages were already a constraint. During: a growing gap between demand and supply.

In January 2025 daily electricity demand was 4,400 megawatts (MW), but generation was only 1,700 MW.^[7] Between January and September 2025 generation averaged 3,034 MW, well below installed capacity of 6,880 MW.^[9] The World Bank blames conflict damage to transmission lines, natural disasters and reduced gas supply. Cross-border electricity imports fell 69%.^[9] Electricity tariffs nearly doubled after September 2024, raising firms’ costs.^[7]

Satellite images of night-time lights confirm the picture. Luminosity fell by 9% in 2022, 10.7% in 2024 and 21.4% in the first nine months of 2025.^[9] In October 2025, 64% of surveyed firms reported power outages. 47% had invested in diesel generators and 32% in solar systems. Losses from outages averaged 15% of sales.^[9] These figures show a supply-side shock: firms cannot produce as much at any given price.

4.6 Labour market and migration

Before: a young, growing workforce. During: weak job creation, conscription pressure and emigration.

About 9 million people joined Myanmar’s working-age population between 2017 and 2022, but employment grew by only 2 million. The employment rate fell by around nine percentage points over the period.^[5] Labour productivity fell by around 10% after 2019.^[5] The World Bank says migration has been driven by “push factors” including conflict, the threat of conscription and falling real incomes.^[6] Around 30% of higher-skilled workers in fields such as engineering and ICT said they were both willing and able to migrate.^[6] The cost of formal migration to Thailand rose to 2.5 months of earnings.^[6]

By October 2025, 14% of firms reported staff resignations, and 53% of those who resigned had moved abroad.^[9] In October 2026 DVB reported that local officials in parts of Mandalay Region were collecting money from households to excuse young men from conscription.^[25] Emigration has one benefit: remittances. Inflows rose by 46% to about US$2.1 billion in FY2024/25.^[9] The cost is a smaller and less skilled workforce at home.

4.7 Poverty, human development and human capital

Before: a poverty rate of 24.8% (2017).^[7] During: a sharp rise in poverty, food insecurity and learning losses.

In July 2021 the World Bank warned that the share of people in poverty was “likely to more than double” by early 2022 compared with 2019.^[2] A year later it estimated that poverty had doubled compared with March 2020, with about 40% of the population below the national poverty line in 2022. It said this had undone “nearly a decade of progress”.^[3] The Bank’s later phone surveys use a different method and put poverty at 31.0% in 2024. They estimate poverty at 47% among displaced people and 34.9% in rural areas.^[7] The 2022 and 2024 figures come from different methods and should not be read as a fall of nine points. Both show poverty well above its 2017 level. The Bank simulated that the earthquake could add a further 2.8 percentage points to poverty.^[7]

UNDP uses a third approach, a multidimensional index that counts gaps in health, education and living standards as well as income. Its October 2026 report found that 32.6% of people were poor and another 19.5 million were vulnerable to poverty. Together that is 68% of the population.^[24]

Hunger has risen. In October 2024, 14.3 million people (25% of the population) faced acute food insecurity, up from 10.7 million a year earlier.^[6] In October 2025 the WFP estimated that 12.4 million people faced acute food insecurity and 756,000 children were acutely malnourished.^[9] Learning has also suffered. Literacy and numeracy scores fell significantly between 2022 and 2024. The World Bank estimates these learning losses could cut future lifetime incomes by 7–15%.^[7] This is a loss of human capital: the skills and health that let people earn a living.

4.8 Natural disasters on top of war: the March 2025 earthquake

On 28 March 2025 a magnitude 7.7 earthquake struck central Myanmar. It came only six months after Typhoon Yagi.^[7] Official reports at the end of April counted around 3,800 deaths, over 5,000 injuries and more than 207,000 people displaced. The quake affected over 17 million people.^[7] The affected states and regions produce about a third of Myanmar’s GDP.^[7] Damage to physical assets was estimated at US$11 billion, or 14% of GDP and 5% of the capital stock. This included US$4.97 billion to homes and US$3.36 billion to public infrastructure.^[7] Output losses in the year to March 2026 were put at about 4% of GDP. The full report values this at US$2.6 billion, while the accompanying press release gives “about US$2 billion”.^[7][8]

Recovery has been slow. By late 2025 only 45% of affected firms were back at pre-earthquake activity levels, and only half of affected households had started repairs.^[9] The World Bank lists high reconstruction costs, limited access to finance and continued conflict among the reasons for slow rebuilding.^[9]

4.9 Sanctions, finance and international isolation

Western governments responded to the coup with sanctions. President Biden said on the day of the coup that it would “necessitate an immediate review” of US sanctions policy.^[1] Targeted sanctions have continued since. For example, the US imposed sanctions on the telecoms operator Mytel in January 2025.^[9] Myanmar is also on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) “call for action” list, often called the blacklist. This means foreign banks must apply extra checks to cross-border payments, which raises the cost of trade finance. In October 2025 the FATF said Myanmar had met only one of five recommended actions.^[9]

Some foreign firms have left. The World Bank notes that Malaysia’s Axiata announced its exit from Myanmar’s telecoms market, citing worsening conditions.^[9] Sanctions policy is shifting, however. In October 2026 the US lifted sanctions on the daughter of a military-linked businessman, part of a wider move towards engagement.^[25] Sanctions are only one cause of Myanmar’s economic decline. The World Bank’s reports give more weight to conflict, power shortages, trade and currency controls, and natural disasters.^[9]

5. What went well and what went wrong

What went well (or less badly)

• The banking system did not collapse. Deposits and credit grew steadily from FY2023/24 to FY2024/25, and confidence in banks improved.^[9]
• Agriculture kept feeding the country and earning foreign currency. Strong agricultural exports supported the trade balance in FY2024/25.^[9]
• Garment exporters adapted to US tariffs as new, mainly Chinese, firms replaced those that left.^[9]
• Remittances through official channels rose 46% in FY2024/25. The World Bank links this to more favourable exchange rates for remittances and closer oversight of employment agencies.^[9]

What went wrong

• A fixed official exchange rate far below the market rate has encouraged arbitrage and foreign currency shortages, and has hurt export competitiveness.^[9]
• Central bank financing of the deficit has fed rapid money growth and inflation.^[9]
• Import licensing and the Export First Policy made it harder for firms without export earnings to buy inputs. This caused shortages, including of fertiliser.^[7]
• Electricity generation has fallen far below capacity, and night-time light data show widespread falls in activity.^[9]
• Disaster preparedness is low by international standards, despite high climate vulnerability, which raises the cost of disasters such as Typhoon Yagi.^[6]
• “Frequently changing rules and regulations” have added uncertainty for business.^[4]

6. The economics behind it

A war of many supply shocks. Myanmar’s crisis is mainly a supply-side story. Fighting closes roads and borders, power cuts stop factories, and skilled workers leave. Each of these reduces the economy’s productive capacity. In AD/AS terms, the short-run aggregate supply (SRAS) curve shifts left. The result is lower output and higher prices at the same time, which is called stagflation. Myanmar shows exactly this mix: GDP shrank in FY2024/25 while inflation was close to 30%.^[9]

The production possibility curve shifts inward. War also reduces long-run potential output. Capital is destroyed (for example, US$11 billion of earthquake damage, much of it not yet repaired). Labour is lost through emigration, and human capital falls through learning losses. All of these shift the production possibility curve (PPC) inward. It does not just mean the economy is producing inside an unchanged frontier. The World Bank’s warning that learning losses could cut lifetime incomes by 7–15% shows this long-run effect.^[7]

Exchange-rate controls and the parallel market. When a government fixes a price below the market level, a shortage follows. Here the price is the kyat price of dollars. Fixing it at 2,100 per dollar makes dollars cheap officially, so demand exceeds supply at that rate.^[9] Rationing then happens through licences, and a black market appears at around double the official price.^[7] Exporters who must convert earnings at the official rate are effectively taxed, which discourages exports. This is the classic economics of a price ceiling.

Money financing and inflation. The quantity theory of money (MV = PY) gives a simple link. If the money supply (M) grows quickly while real output (Y) falls, the price level (P) must rise unless the velocity of money (V) falls. The World Bank reports that money aggregates kept expanding rapidly, partly because of central bank lending to the government.^[9]

Sanctions and trade diversion. Sanctions and the FATF listing raise the cost of dealing with Myanmar through Western banks.^[9] Trade then shifts towards partners that do not impose those costs. The World Bank notes official efforts to reduce reliance on US dollar payments by promoting the Thai baht and Chinese yuan.^[7] Singapore, China, Hong Kong and Thailand now supply almost all new FDI commitments.^[9] This is trade and investment diversion: activity does not stop, but it moves to fewer partners, usually on worse terms.

Institutions and the opportunity cost of conflict. Institutional economics argues that secure property rights and predictable rules are central to long-run growth. Myanmar’s rapidly changing rules, currency crackdowns and conflict reduce the expected return on investment. The opportunity cost of the war goes beyond military spending. It includes the factories, schools and power lines that were not built, and the 13% of output that has gone missing compared with 2019.^[9]

7. Outlook and the way forward

Baseline. The World Bank’s June 2026 forecast is 2% growth in FY2026/27.^[11] The IMF also projects 2% growth for the following year.^[13] At this pace the economy would take many years just to regain its 2019 size. The IMF projects inflation of about 20% in 2026 and 16% in 2027.^[14]

Reconstruction needs. The only recent, detailed damage estimate is for the earthquake: US$11 billion of physical damage.^[7] No comprehensive public estimate exists of war damage since 2021, so the full reconstruction bill is unknown. The World Bank expects reconstruction to support growth but says “ongoing financing shortfalls, labor shortages, weak domestic demand, and structural bottlenecks” will limit the pace.^[10]

Upside scenario. A real reduction in fighting would reopen border trade routes and allow repairs to power lines. Better relations with ASEAN neighbours and the United States could ease access to finance and investment.^[22][25] Unifying the exchange rate and ending central bank financing of the deficit would cut inflation and help exporters, in line with the problems the World Bank identifies.^[9]

Downside scenario. The World Bank says risks are “firmly tilted to the downside”. It lists continued conflict, new natural disasters, tighter trade and currency controls, and shortages of essential imports.^[9] External risks include weaker export earnings and volatile energy prices.^[12] If the FATF imposes stricter countermeasures, trade finance could become even more expensive.^[9]

The human capital question. Whatever happens politically, Myanmar’s long-run prospects depend on rebuilding schools, health services and skills. The World Bank warns that declining job quality and the movement of educated workers into agriculture threaten long-term development.^[7] Stopping the outflow of skilled young people may matter more for future growth than any single infrastructure project.

8. Exam-style questions

Glossary

• Coup d’état: the sudden, illegal seizure of government power, usually by the military.
• Real GDP: the value of a country’s output, adjusted for inflation.
• Fiscal year (FY): the 12-month period a government uses for its budget. Myanmar now uses April–March.
• Parallel (black) market exchange rate: the rate at which currency trades outside official channels when official access is restricted.
• Price ceiling: a legal maximum price set below the market equilibrium, which causes shortages.
• Deficit monetisation: financing a government deficit by borrowing from the central bank, which effectively creates new money.
• Stagflation: falling or stagnant output combined with high inflation.
• Import compression: a fall in imports caused by shortages of foreign currency or controls, not by lower demand.
• FATF “call for action” list: the Financial Action Task Force’s list of high-risk jurisdictions for money laundering and terrorist financing, often called the blacklist.
• Multidimensional poverty: poverty measured by overlapping deprivations in health, education and living standards, not just income.
• Human capital: the skills, knowledge and health that make workers productive.
• Remittances: money sent home by people working abroad.

References

1. NPR (2021). “Myanmar Coup: With Aung San Suu Kyi Detained, Military Takes Over Government”. NPR, 1 February 2021. https://www.npr.org/2021/02/01/962758188/myanmar-coup-military-detains-aung-san-suu-kyi-plans-new-election-in-2022
2. World Bank (2021). “Myanmar Economic Monitor, July 2021: Progress Threatened; Resilience Tested”. World Bank, July 2021. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/myanmar/publication/myanmar-economic-monitor-july-2021-progress-threatened-resilience-tested
3. World Bank (2022). “Myanmar Economic Monitor, July 2022: Reforms Reversed”. World Bank, July 2022. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/myanmar/publication/myanmar-economic-monitor-july-2022-reforms-reversed
4. World Bank (2023). “Myanmar Economic Monitor, January 2023: Navigating Uncertainty”. World Bank, January 2023. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/myanmar/publication/myanmar-economic-monitor-january-2023-navigating-uncertainty
5. World Bank (2023). “Myanmar Economic Monitor, June 2023: A Fragile Recovery – Key Findings”. World Bank, June 2023. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/myanmar/publication/myanmar-economic-monitor-june-2023-a-fragile-recovery-key-findings
6. World Bank (2024). “Myanmar Economic Monitor: Compounding Crises – Special Focus: International Migration from Myanmar”. World Bank, 10 December 2024. https://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099121024092015654/pdf/P507203-0fc16ea4-322f-4325-ba69-e1227abb7375.pdf
7. World Bank (2025). “Myanmar Economic Monitor: Economic Aftershocks”. World Bank, June 2025 (copy hosted by MIMU). https://themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/Report_Myanmar_Economic_Monitor_Economic_Aftershocks_WB_Jun2025.pdf
8. World Bank (2025). “Earthquake Compounds Myanmar’s Economic Challenges” (press release). World Bank, 12 June 2025. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/06/12/earthquake-compounds-myanmar-s-economic-challenges
9. World Bank (2025). “Myanmar Economic Monitor: Surviving, Not Thriving – Special Focus on Myanmar’s Agrifood Industry Resilience and Adaptability”. World Bank, December 2025. https://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099120625204042781/pdf/P507203-7c4662b6-c1d8-4c3c-9b0c-d4835f2763cb.pdf
10. World Bank (2025). “Myanmar’s Economy Shows Moderate Signs of Recovery amid Earthquake and Conflict Impacts” (press release). World Bank, 8 December 2025. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/12/08/myanmar-s-economy-shows-moderate-signs-of-recovery-amid-earthquake-and-conflict-impacts
11. World Bank (2026). “Myanmar’s Economy Shows Tentative Stabilization, but Fuel Shock Intensifies Pressures” (press release). World Bank, 16 June 2026. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2026/06/16/myanmar-s-economy-shows-tentative-stabilization-but-fuel-shock-intensifies-pressures
12. DVB / Reuters (2026). “World Bank cuts Myanmar growth forecast as fuel shock deepens economic strains”. Democratic Voice of Burma, 16 June 2026. https://english.dvb.no/world-bank-cuts-myanmar-growth-forecast-as-fuel-shock-deepens-economic-strains/
13. IMF (2026). “Real GDP growth (annual percent change), Myanmar”. World Economic Outlook via IMF DataMapper, accessed 14 October 2026. https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/api/v1/NGDP_RPCH
14. IMF (2026). “Inflation, average consumer prices (annual percent change), Myanmar”. World Economic Outlook via IMF DataMapper, accessed 14 October 2026. https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/api/v1/PCPIPCH
15. World Bank (2026). “Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$) – Myanmar”. World Development Indicators, accessed 14 October 2026. https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/MMR/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?format=json
16. World Bank (2026). “Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, period average) – Myanmar”. World Development Indicators, accessed 14 October 2026. https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/MMR/indicator/PA.NUS.FCRF?format=json
17. Al Jazeera (2023). “Ethnic rebel alliance attacks military positions across northern Myanmar”. Al Jazeera, 27 October 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/27/ethnic-rebel-alliance-attacks-military-positions-across-northern-myanmar
18. DVB (2026). “USDP to form next ‘government’ in Myanmar; Civil society groups condemn new ASEAN Special Envoy”. Democratic Voice of Burma, 19 January 2026. https://english.dvb.no/?p=114494
19. DVB (2026). “Preliminary election results show USDP victory; Min Aung Hlaing dismisses international criticism”. Democratic Voice of Burma, 27 January 2026. https://english.dvb.no/?p=114777
20. Dunant, B. (2026). “Myanmar’s ‘Election’ Reveals Hairline Cracks in Military Rule”. Fulcrum, ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 6 March 2026. https://fulcrum.sg/myanmars-election-reveals-hairline-cracks-in-military-rule/
21. Keystone-SDA / dpa (2026). “Junta leader elected president in Myanmar”. blue News, 3 April 2026. https://www.bluewin.ch/en/news/international/junta-leader-elected-president-in-myanmar-li.3173896
22. DVB (2026). “Naypyidaw launches ASEAN committee in bid to restore Myanmar standing within bloc”. Democratic Voice of Burma, 14 October 2026. https://english.dvb.no/naypyidaw-launches-asean-affairs-committee-in-push-to-restore-myanmar-within-regional-bloc/
23. DVB (2026). “Military counteroffensive in Magway Region pushes toward Rakhine State amid aerial attacks”. Democratic Voice of Burma, 14 October 2026. https://english.dvb.no/military-counteroffensive-in-magway-region-pushes-toward-rakhine-state-amid-aerial-attacks/
24. DVB (2026). “Bangladesh reaffirms safe Rohingya repatriation; UN reports most Myanmar people living in poverty” (reporting a UNDP survey). Democratic Voice of Burma, 13 October 2026. https://english.dvb.no/bangladesh-reaffirms-safe-rohingya-repatriation-un-reports-most-myanmar-people-living-in-poverty/
25. DVB (2026). “US lifts sanctions on Myanmar crony’s daughter amid policy shift and sweeping sanctions on ICC”. Democratic Voice of Burma, 11 October 2026. https://english.dvb.no/us-lifts-sanctions-on-myanmar-cronys-daughter-amid-policy-shift-and-imposes-sweeping-sanctions-on-icc/

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