Ethiopia’s Tigray War, 2020–2022: The Cost of Conflict in a Fast-Growing Economy

1. Background: how the war began

For 27 years the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) dominated Ethiopian politics. Its dominance ended when Abiy Ahmed became prime minister in 2018.^[28] Tigrayans make up about 6% of Ethiopia’s population, but the TPLF dominated the coalition that had ruled the country since 1991.^[1][24] Abiy dissolved that coalition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, and replaced it with his more centralised Prosperity Party.^[24] In September 2020 Tigray held a regional election in defiance of the federal government.^[1]

In early November 2020 Abiy ordered a military offensive in Tigray. He accused the TPLF of attacking Ethiopia’s military.^[1] The federal army was backed by Eritrean troops and Amhara regional forces.^[28] The war went through several phases. In November 2021, after Tigrayan forces said they were gaining ground and considering a march on Addis Ababa, the government declared a national state of emergency.^[2] The fighting, which also reached the neighbouring Amhara and Afar regions, lasted until November 2022.^[5][28]

The war ended in November 2022 with an agreement signed in Pretoria, South Africa, under African Union mediation. It was a permanent cessation of hostilities and set terms for Tigray’s disarmament.^[28] Only the federal government and the TPLF signed. Eritrea and the Amhara forces were not parties.^[28] A key dispute was left unresolved: Western Tigray, a fertile area claimed by both Tigray and Amhara and occupied by Amhara forces since the start of the war.^[6][28]

2. Where things stand now

As of October 2026, the Pretoria peace has broken down and northern Ethiopia is at war again. The road back to war was gradual. In March 2025 a power struggle inside the TPLF forced Tigray’s interim president, Getachew Reda, to flee to Addis Ababa.^[22] In April 2026 the TPLF reinstated Tigray’s pre-war parliament. It accused the federal government of violating the Pretoria agreement and of withholding funds to pay civil servants.^[23] Getachew, by then an adviser to the prime minister, called this “a clear repudiation” of the post-war arrangements.^[23]

Ethiopia held a general election on 1 June 2026. Tigray was excluded entirely, and voting was also suspended in parts of Oromia and Amhara for security reasons.^[24] More than 50 million people were registered.^[25] Abiy was sworn in for a new five-year term in early October 2026.^[32] By mid-July the TPLF had declared the Pretoria agreement “effectively dead”. On 1 August, federal and Tigrayan forces clashed near Shererina, close to the Sudanese border. Each side blamed the other.^[26] Hundreds of Tigrayans fled into Sudan.^[27]

On 20 September 2026 seven armed groups, including the TPLF, the Amhara Fano National Movement and the Oromo Liberation Army, announced an alliance pledged to remove Abiy’s government.^[28] On 23 September the federal government and the Tigrayan authorities accused each other of launching offensives. Tigrayan forces took control of airports in the region, and Ethiopian Airlines cancelled all flights to Tigray.^[29] Telecoms and internet links in Tigray went down. Reuters reported that the TPLF had ordered the operators to cut them.^[30] The government accused Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt of backing the alliance, which they denied. On 1 October Eritrea cut diplomatic ties with Ethiopia after Addis Ababa expelled ten Eritrean diplomats.^[31]

Federal forces captured Mekelle, Tigray’s capital, in early October after Tigrayan forces withdrew.^[33][35] Ethiopia told the UN Security Council that Eritrean troops had advanced up to 60 km inside Tigray. Eritrea called the claim false.^[34] By 10 October federal forces were reported to be in Adigrat, 30 km from the Eritrean border.^[34] Ethiopian Airlines resumed flights to Mekelle on 11 October, and federal forces entered the town of Adwa.^[35] The economic stakes reach beyond Tigray. Fighting in Afar threatens the road from Djibouti, Ethiopia’s main trade route to the sea.^[32]

3. The economy before the war

Before 2020 Ethiopia was one of the world’s fastest-growing economies. World Bank data show real GDP growth of 12.6% in 2010 and above 8% in most years up to 2019, an average of about 9.8%.^[15] IMF figures, which are based on Ethiopia’s July–July fiscal year, show growth of 7.7–10.4% a year from 2015 to 2019.^[19]

Growth was driven by the state. The World Bank calls this a “state-led development model”. It expanded drinking water to 60 million more people, doubled electricity access and raised child vaccinations by 64%.^[14] Poverty fell from 39% to 24% between 2004 and 2016.^[14] But the World Bank says the model “relied on overvalued currency, unsustainable debt, and regulations that limited private investment”. It did not create enough jobs for the 1.8 million new job seekers each year, and poverty rose from 27% to 32% between 2016 and 2021.^[14]

Other pre-war indicators show both strengths and weak spots. Inflation was already 12.6% in 2019.^[20] General government debt was 54.7% of GDP.^[21] Exports of goods and services were only 7.9% of GDP.^[18] Foreign direct investment (FDI) was strong, reaching US$4.1 billion in 2016 and US$2.5 billion in 2019.^[17] Around 70% of the workforce depends on agriculture.^[14] The official exchange rate averaged 29.1 birr per US dollar in 2019.^[16]

4. The economic impact: indicator by indicator

4.1 Output and GDP

Before: growth of 9.0% in 2019 (IMF).^[19] During the war: 6.1% in 2020, 6.3% in 2021 and 6.4% in 2022.^[19]

These official numbers show growth slowing but staying positive. That may seem surprising for a war this deadly. There are two reasons to read them carefully. First, Tigrayans are only about 6% of Ethiopia’s population, so even a collapse in Tigray has a limited effect on the national total.^[1] Second, measuring output in a region under siege is very hard. In January 2022 the World Food Programme said no aid convoys had reached Mekelle since mid-December, so independent data collection was also limited.^[5] National data from Tigray in this period should be treated with caution.

After the war, official growth picked up again: 7.2% in 2023, 8.1% in 2024 and 9.2% in 2025 (IMF).^[19] The World Bank also gives 9.2% for FY2024/25.^[14] The IMF projected 9.2% for 2026, and government officials have said growth may top 10% in 2026.^[13][25] These forecasts were made before the new fighting in September 2026. Sources differ slightly: the World Bank’s database gives 9.8% for 2025.^[15]

4.2 Inflation and the currency

Before: inflation of 12.6% (2019) and an official rate of 29.1 birr per dollar.^[20][16] During and after: inflation above 30% in 2022–2023 and a birr worth less than half its 2019 value by 2024.^[20][16]

On IMF data, inflation was 19.9% in 2020, 20.2% in 2021, 33.9% in 2022 and 32.5% in 2023.^[20] The World Bank lists the war in Ukraine, the Tigray conflict, droughts and economic imbalances together as the crises behind Ethiopia’s problems.^[14]

Before July 2024 the birr was managed by the central bank. It weakened steadily: the official rate averaged 34.9 birr per dollar in 2020, 51.8 in 2022 and 54.6 in 2023.^[16] Yet it was still overvalued. On the parallel market the dollar cost about double the official rate.^[10] The IMF identified exchange-rate overvaluation as the “key distortion” behind Ethiopia’s balance of payments problems.^[11]

On 29 July 2024 the National Bank of Ethiopia allowed the birr to float. Commercial banks could now buy and sell foreign currency at negotiated prices. The Commercial Bank of Ethiopia reported that the birr fell 30% against the dollar.^[10] The official average for 2024 was 82.6 birr per dollar.^[16] The World Bank reports that the gap between official and parallel rates narrowed from over 100% to around 15%.^[14] Inflation did not spike as some had feared.^[10] It fell to 26.6% in 2024 and 16.0% in 2025, and the IMF projects about 12% for 2026.^[20][13] The IMF said the move to a flexible exchange rate “has proceeded with little disruption”.^[12]

4.3 Public finances, debt default and the IMF programme

Before: general government debt of 54.7% of GDP in 2019.^[21] During and after: lost budget support, a debt default in 2023 and a major IMF-backed reform in 2024.^[14][11]

The war damaged Ethiopia’s access to finance. In November 2021 the US special envoy for the Horn of Africa warned that the conflict was leading “inevitably” towards sanctions and other measures.^[2] The World Bank says that multiple crises, including the Tigray conflict, “led to a debt default in 2023”.^[14] A debt default happens when a government fails to make a payment it owes to lenders on time. Ethiopia’s external debt was around US$28 billion in mid-2024.^[10]

The way out came through a package agreed in July 2024. On 29 July the IMF approved a four-year Extended Credit Facility of SDR 2.556 billion, about US$3.4 billion, with an immediate disbursement of about US$1 billion.^[11] The BBC reported that the government floated the birr in order to secure US$10.7 billion from the IMF and the World Bank combined.^[10] The World Bank says the reforms are also backed by G-20 debt relief.^[14] Other reforms included the following:^[11]

• a new policy interest rate, introduced on 11 July 2024
• an end to direct central bank lending to the government
• a plan to raise tax revenue towards the average for other African countries
• a temporary spending package of about 1.5% of GDP for poorer households, including fuel and fertiliser subsidies

Debt ratios moved in an interesting way. General government debt fell from 54.7% of GDP in 2019 to 33.5% in 2024. High inflation, which raises nominal GDP, is one likely reason. It then jumped to 43.3% in 2025.^[21] The jump is consistent with an exchange-rate effect. Foreign-currency debt is worth many more birr after a devaluation, while GDP is measured in birr. As of March 2026 Ethiopia owed the IMF SDR 1,764.5 million.^[13] In July 2025 the IMF said the first year of the programme had “yielded strong results”.^[12]

4.4 Trade, investment and the loss of AGOA

Before: duty-free access to the US market under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and FDI of US$2.5 billion in 2019.^[4][17] During: loss of AGOA from January 2022 and exports falling to 5.5% of GDP by 2024.^[3][18]

AGOA gives eligible sub-Saharan African countries duty-free access to the US market if they meet conditions on matters such as human rights and political pluralism.^[4] On 2 November 2021 President Biden told Congress that he intended to end Ethiopia’s eligibility from 1 January 2022 “for gross violations of internationally recognized human rights”.^[3] Al Jazeera reported that the decision threatened Ethiopia’s textile industry, which supplies global fashion brands, and its hopes of becoming a light-manufacturing hub.^[4] The US left a “pathway toward reinstatement” open.^[4] In September 2026 the US lifted sanctions on Ethiopia and Eritrea that had been linked to atrocities in the war, saying the “national emergency… has expired”.^[30]

Exports of goods and services fell from 7.9% of GDP in 2019 to 6.6% in 2023 and 5.5% in 2024.^[18] They then jumped to 13.3% of GDP in 2025.^[18] Much of this jump is likely to reflect the cheaper birr. Export earnings in dollars are worth far more birr after devaluation, so their share of birr GDP rises.

FDI held up better than many expected. Net inflows were US$2.4 billion in 2020, US$4.3 billion in 2021 and about US$3.3–4.0 billion a year in 2022–2025.^[17]

4.5 Labour market and jobs

Before: an economy unable to absorb all its young job seekers. During: the same pressure, plus displacement and the loss of export jobs.

About 2 million Ethiopians reach working age each year.^[14] About 70% of the workforce depends on agriculture, most of it rain-fed and exposed to drought.^[14] The war hit both farm and factory work. In the north, 3 million people were displaced from their homes and land.^[14] In manufacturing, losing AGOA threatened export textile jobs.^[4] The sources used here give no comprehensive estimate of jobs lost in the conflict regions. The World Bank stresses that “progress in job creation” is essential for growth to be shared fairly.^[14]

4.6 Humanitarian costs, poverty and human capital

Before: poverty of 24% in 2016.^[14] During: famine warnings, mass displacement and poverty of 32% by 2021.^[14]

Deaths. Estimates differ widely. The African Union’s mediator, former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo, believes that about 600,000 people died.^[28] In 2025 the BBC described the death toll as “an estimated half a million”.^[22] The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, which counts only battle-related deaths, recorded over 100,000 in 2022 alone. That is more than in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that year.^[7] The higher estimates include deaths from hunger and lack of health care, which are much harder to count.

Hunger and blockade. In January 2022 the WFP said more than 5 million people in Tigray needed food aid, but fuel and food shortages meant it had reached only 20% of those it should have. More than 4 million people needed food aid in the neighbouring Amhara and Afar regions.^[5] The WHO’s director-general accused the authorities of blocking medical supplies. The government denied targeting civilians and rejected his statements.^[5] The UN human rights office reported at least 108 civilian deaths in the first two weeks of 2022 from airstrikes allegedly carried out by the Ethiopian air force.^[5] In 2020–2022, Tigray was cut off from telecoms and supplies, and Al Jazeera reports that the blockade caused famine-like conditions for hundreds of thousands of people.^[30] Serious abuses were also alleged against other parties. The US State Department accused forces in Western Tigray of “ethnic cleansing” of Tigrayans, and there were massacres of both Tigrayans and Amharas in that area.^[6]

Displacement and aid dependence. The World Bank says the Tigray conflict displaced 3 million people. About 15 million Ethiopians still rely on food aid.^[14]

Poverty. National poverty rose from 27% in 2016 to 32% in 2021.^[14] The war was not the only cause, but this period covers the conflict as well as COVID-19 and drought. Ethiopia’s GDP per head was US$979 according to the World Bank, which makes it one of the poorest countries in the world.^[14] Human capital levels “have stayed low”.^[14]

4.7 Physical damage and reconstruction

In November 2022 Ethiopia’s finance minister estimated that the country would need nearly US$20 billion to rebuild.^[6] The World Bank also puts humanitarian and reconstruction needs at US$20 billion.^[14] That is about five times Ethiopia’s FDI inflows in 2024, which were around US$4 billion.^[17] AP reported widespread damage to infrastructure.^[6] By 2026 the TPLF was accusing the federal government of withholding funds for civil servants’ pay.^[23] In September 2026 a Mekelle resident told the BBC that the government had been “denying budgets to the civil servants” for seven or eight months and that banks were running out of cash.^[29] This is a personal account and has not been independently verified.

4.8 The Amhara (Fano) conflict

Peace in Tigray did not bring peace to the whole country. In April 2023 the federal government moved to fold regional security forces into national ones, in pursuit of “a strong centralised army”. Gun battles and mass protests followed in Amhara, Ethiopia’s second-largest region. Banks and shops closed, and mobile internet was blocked in some areas.^[8] Fighting between federal forces and the Fano militia, which had fought on the government’s side in Tigray, followed.^[9] In August 2023 health workers said a drone strike in Finote Selam killed at least 26 civilians. Roadblocks meant oxygen and other medical supplies were running short.^[9] By 2026 Fano had taken swathes of the Amhara countryside, and voting did not take place in at least eight of the region’s 138 constituencies.^[25] The Amhara conflict shows how the end of one war can leave armed groups, weapons and grievances that feed the next.

5. What went well and what went wrong

What went well

• The July 2024 float largely ended the parallel-market premium, which fell from over 100% to around 15%.^[14]
• Inflation fell after the reform rather than rising, from 32.5% in 2023 to 16.0% in 2025.^[20]
• The reforms unlocked large international financing, including a US$3.4 billion IMF programme and G-20 debt relief.^[11][14]
• The government cushioned the reform with a temporary package for poorer households worth about 1.5% of GDP.^[11]
• Ending direct central bank lending to the government removed a major source of money creation.^[11]

What went wrong

• The pre-war model relied on an overvalued currency, unsustainable debt and limits on private investment, leaving little room to absorb the shock of war.^[14]
• The country lost AGOA access, which hurt export manufacturing.^[3][4]
• Ethiopia defaulted on its debt in 2023.^[14]
• Humanitarian access to Tigray was severely restricted during the war, with famine warnings from the UN.^[5]
• The peace deal left core disputes unresolved, especially Western Tigray, disarmament and the TPLF’s legal status. These helped bring war back in 2026.^[26][28]
• An export surrender requirement still encourages some use of the parallel market, according to the World Bank.^[14]

6. The economics behind it

Opportunity cost. Every birr spent on war could have been spent on schools, clinics or roads. The opportunity cost of the Tigray war also includes the destroyed capital (US$20 billion of reconstruction needs), the lost output of displaced people and the lost lives.^[14] For a country with GDP per head under US$1,000, these trade-offs are severe.^[14]

The PPC shifts inward, but unevenly. War destroys capital and kills or displaces workers, so the production possibility curve (PPC) shifts inward. In Ethiopia the shift was concentrated in the north. A useful way to picture it is a national PPC that moves inward only a little, made up of regional PPCs where Tigray’s collapses sharply. This helps explain why national GDP growth stayed positive while Tigray faced famine warnings.^[19][5]

Overvaluation and devaluation. A currency is overvalued when its official price is higher than the market would set. Before 2024, an overvalued birr made imports cheap for those who could get dollars at the official rate. It made exports less competitive and created a parallel market where dollars cost twice as much.^[10] Floating the birr made exports more competitive. The Marshall–Lerner condition states that a devaluation improves the trade balance if the sum of the price elasticities of demand for exports and imports is greater than one. The J-curve suggests the trade balance may first worsen, because import prices rise immediately while volumes take time to adjust. Students can test this using Ethiopia’s post-2024 trade data as it is published.

Debt dynamics. Whether debt is sustainable depends on the interest rate (r), the growth rate (g) and the primary balance. High nominal growth from inflation can lower the debt-to-GDP ratio. This happened in Ethiopia between 2019 and 2024.^[21] A devaluation then increases the birr value of foreign-currency debt, which pushed the ratio up again in 2025.^[21] This “valuation effect” is why countries with large foreign-currency debts fear devaluation.

Trade sanctions and conditionality. Removing AGOA access was a conditional trade sanction. It raised the cost of Ethiopian exports to the US in order to change government behaviour.^[3] Economic theory predicts that the burden falls partly on workers in the export sector. The IMF programme works through a different form of conditionality: finance in exchange for policy reforms.^[11]

The conflict trap. Development economists describe a “conflict trap”, in which low income raises the risk of war and war then lowers income. Ethiopia’s return to fighting in 2026, less than four years after Pretoria, fits that pattern.^[29] Unresolved disputes over territory and power, weak trust between parties and armed groups left outside the peace deal all raised the risk of renewed war.^[28]

7. Outlook and the way forward

Before the new war. In mid-2026 the outlook looked strong on paper. The IMF projected growth of 9.2% and inflation of about 12% for 2026.^[13] Government debt was projected to fall to 37% of GDP by 2027.^[21] The reform programme had stabilised the currency and inflation.^[12][14]

Scenario 1: a short conflict, contained in the north. If fighting stays limited and the federal government keeps control of major towns and roads, the macroeconomic damage could be modest at national level. The human cost in Tigray would still be high. Restoring flights to Mekelle in October 2026 points in this direction.^[35]

Scenario 2: a wider, longer war. If fighting spreads through Afar and Amhara, the Djibouti trade corridor, Ethiopia’s main route to the sea, would be at risk.^[32] A war with Eritrea would add a regional dimension. Ethiopia has already accused Eritrea of an “all-out invasion”, and Eritrea accuses Ethiopia of aggression.^[33] In this case, defence spending could squeeze social spending, inflation could return, and donors and investors could pull back.

Scenario 3: a renewed peace process. The African Union has called for an immediate de-escalation and a return to talks.^[29] A durable settlement would need to resolve the issues Pretoria left open, especially Western Tigray and disarmament.^[28] Reconstruction of US$20 billion could then become a source of growth rather than a stalled promise.^[14]

Long-run tasks. Whatever happens militarily, the World Bank’s list of priorities is clear: create jobs at scale, reduce the state’s dominance of the economy, increase trade integration and reduce the incidence of conflict.^[14] It also warns that climate change could cost 1–1.5% of GDP a year, rising to 5% by the 2040s.^[14] Ethiopia’s experience shows that rapid growth is not enough. Without political settlements that last, growth can be reversed by war.

8. Exam-style questions

Glossary

• Cessation of hostilities: an agreement to stop fighting, which may come before a full political settlement.
• State-led development: a growth model in which the government directs investment and industrialisation.
• AGOA: the US African Growth and Opportunity Act, which gives eligible sub-Saharan countries duty-free access to the US market.
• Debt default: failure to make a scheduled payment of interest or principal to lenders.
• Extended Credit Facility (ECF): an IMF lending programme for low-income countries with long-term balance of payments problems.
• Floating exchange rate: an exchange rate set by supply and demand in the currency market rather than fixed by the central bank.
• Overvalued currency: a currency whose official price is higher than the market would set.
• Parallel market premium: the percentage by which the unofficial price of foreign currency exceeds the official price.
• Valuation effect: a change in the domestic-currency value of foreign-currency debt caused by exchange-rate movements.
• J-curve: the pattern in which a trade balance worsens just after a devaluation before improving.
• Conflict trap: a cycle in which poverty raises the risk of war and war deepens poverty.
• Conditionality: policy conditions attached to loans or trade preferences.

References

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3. The White House (2021). “A Message to the Congress on the Termination of the Designation of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the Republic of Guinea, and the Republic of Mali as beneficiary sub-Saharan African countries under the African Growth and Opportunity Act”. The White House, 2 November 2021. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/11/02/a-message-to-the-congress-on-the-termination-of-the-designation-of-the-federal-democratic-republic-of-ethiopia-ethiopia-the-republic-of-guinea-guinea-and-the-republic-of-mali-mali-as-beneficia/
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31. Al Jazeera (2026). “Eritrea severs diplomatic ties with Ethiopia in tit-for-tat move”. Al Jazeera, 1 October 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/1/eritrea-severs-diplomatic-ties-with-ethiopia-in-tit-for-tat-move
32. Deutsche Welle (2026). “Ethiopia: PM Abiy starts new term as regional tensions rise”. DW, 6 October 2026. https://www.dw.com/en/tigray-war-may-spill-over-to-eritrea-helped-by-prime-minister-abiy-ahmeds-rhetoric/a-79562957
33. BBC News (2026). “Ethiopia warns Eritrea it will defend itself after troops cross border”. BBC, 9 October 2026. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c65ynvw250y1o
34. Reuters (2026). “Ethiopian forces regain control of border city after reported Eritrean incursion”. The Straits Times, 10 October 2026. https://www.straitstimes.com/world/ethiopian-forces-regain-control-of-border-city-after-reported-eritrean-incursion
35. Al Jazeera (2026). “Ethiopian forces enter strategic Tigray town of Adwa, witnesses say”. Al Jazeera, 12 October 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/12/ethiopian-troops-capture-adwa-without-a-fight-witnesses-say

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