- A government at war can pay in three basic ways: taxation, borrowing and money creation, topped up by aid and savings.
- The budget constraint links them: \(G – T = \Delta B + \Delta M\).
- Taxes hit incentives, borrowing raises debt and crowds out investment, printing money creates inflation.
- After 1945 the US and UK cut huge war debts partly through financial repression: interest rates held below inflation for years.
- Ukraine since 2022 shows all three tools at once: central bank financing in 2022, heavy external borrowing and grants, and tax measures backed by an IMF programme.
The case: a war budget with a hole in it
Imagine you are a finance minister. War breaks out. Defence spending must jump from 3% of GDP to perhaps 25% within a year. Tax revenue cannot rise that fast, and investors are nervous.
This is not a thought experiment. It is the problem the United States and United Kingdom faced in the Second World War, and the problem Ukraine has faced since February 2022. It is also a favourite exam question: “Explain how a government might finance a large increase in spending, and assess which method is least harmful to the economy.”
This guide gives you the three methods, three worked calculations, a chart of real war debt and the evaluation points examiners reward, for AP Macroeconomics, Cambridge 9708, IB Economics and first-year university. For a longer historical tour, see our case study Paying for War: Taxes, Borrowing, Money Printing and Aid.
The government budget constraint
Start with one identity. Whatever a government spends must come from somewhere.
If war spending \(G\) rises and taxes \(T\) do not keep up, the gap must be filled by selling bonds to households, banks and foreigners (\(\Delta B\)), or by the central bank buying government debt with newly created money (\(\Delta M\)). Grants from allies work like extra revenue, and running down a sovereign wealth fund works like borrowing from yourself.
There is no free option. Reject higher taxes and money creation, and you have chosen debt.
Method 1: taxation
Tax finance is the most transparent method: the cost falls on people now, in the open, with no debt left for later.
The problem is speed and incentives. Tax systems take time to change. Very high marginal tax rates also reduce the reward for work and investment. Economists call the idea of spreading taxes evenly over time tax smoothing: because the cost of taxes rises more than proportionally with the tax rate, it is cheaper to raise taxes a little for many years than a lot for one year. That is the main case for borrowing during a war.
Russia shows tax finance in action. To pay for a long war, it raised its corporate profit tax from 20% to 25% at the start of 2025, and set its VAT rate to rise by two percentage points to 22% from the start of 2026[6]. VAT is a broad consumption tax, so a small rise raises a lot, but it falls hardest on lower-income households.
Taxation has one more wartime benefit. By cutting disposable income, it reduces consumer demand, freeing real resources (steel, workers, energy) for the war effort and keeping inflation down.
Method 2: borrowing
Borrowing means selling government bonds. In the world wars, governments sold small-denomination war bonds directly to households, using patriotic campaigns. Today it is mostly from banks, markets and, for poorer countries, foreign governments and international institutions.
Borrowing spreads the cost over time. It has three costs.
- Higher public debt. Debt must be serviced. Interest competes with schools, hospitals and rebuilding.
- Crowding out. If the government borrows heavily from domestic savers, it competes with firms for loanable funds. Interest rates rise and private investment falls.
- Rollover risk. If investors lose confidence, the government may be unable to refinance debt when it falls due, which can force default or money creation.
Figure 1 shows how large these debts became in the Second World War. US gross public debt rose from 38.6% of GDP in 1941 to 121.2% in 1946. UK debt, already high after the First World War, reached 269.8% of GDP in 1946[1].
The striking part of the chart is the fall. By 1960, US debt was down to 61.7% of GDP and UK debt to 117.9%. Neither repaid most of its debt in cash: ratios fell because real growth and inflation raised nominal GDP while interest rates were held low.
Ukraine shows modern war borrowing from abroad. In February 2026 the IMF approved a new four-year Extended Fund Facility of about US$8.1 billion, as part of a US$136.5 billion international support package, with financing from EU facilities, the G7 and bilateral donors filling most of the gap. The IMF projected Ukraine’s public debt at 108.7% of GDP in 2025, rising to 122.6% in 2026[5]. External finance avoids crushing taxes or runaway printing, but builds a debt burden that growth or restructuring must later resolve.
Method 3: money creation
The third method is for the central bank to buy government bonds with newly created money. This is often called monetary financing or, loosely, “printing money”.
Money creation is fast: it needs no vote, no tax law and no willing investors. But it works by raising prices, so it is a hidden tax on anyone holding cash or fixed-income assets. The inflation tax on real money balances \(m = M/P\) is approximately:
where \(\pi\) is the inflation rate. The trap is that people respond. As inflation rises, they hold less money, so \(m\) shrinks. The government must create money ever faster to collect the same real revenue. Push this far enough and you get hyperinflation.
Ukraine used this tool in the first year of the full-scale invasion. The National Bank of Ukraine bought government bonds directly to avoid a collapse of public finances, a total of UAH 400 billion in 2022. To contain the inflationary effect, it raised its key policy rate by 15 percentage points to 25% in June 2022, and in October 2022 it agreed a plan with the finance ministry with the aim of ending monetary financing of the budget in 2023[4]. That is the textbook sequence: money creation as a short bridge, high interest rates to protect the currency, then borrowing and aid.
Worked examples
A country’s military spending rises by 25% of GDP for one year. Tax revenue rises by 10% of GDP. Households and banks buy new government bonds worth 11% of GDP. How much must the central bank finance, and what share of the war is paid for by each method? (The figures are illustrative.)
Conclusion: 40% tax, 44% borrowing, 16% money creation. Know three numbers and the identity gives you the fourth.
Households hold real money balances worth 20% of GDP. The government finances part of the war by creating money, and inflation reaches 25% a year. Estimate the inflation tax. What happens if inflation reaches 100% and money holdings fall to 12% of GDP? (The figures are illustrative.)
Conclusion: quadrupling inflation (25% to 100%) raises revenue only from 4% to 6% of GDP, because people flee from money. The inflation tax is a poor, painful and unstable way to pay for a war.
After a war, debt is 120% of GDP. The government pays a nominal interest rate of 2.5%. Inflation is 5% and real growth is 3%. It runs a primary surplus (budget surplus before interest) of 1% of GDP. Find the debt ratio after one year, and how much of the fall comes from the negative real interest rate. (The figures are illustrative.)
Conclusion: debt falls 7.3 points in one year, and about 2.8 points of that comes from financial repression. Repeat for five years and the ratio falls from 120% to about 87%.
The consequences: inflation, debt, crowding out and financial repression
| Method | Speed | Main cost | Who pays | Historical or recent example |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Taxation | Slow to legislate | Weaker incentives; lower consumption now | Current taxpayers, openly | Russia: profit tax to 25% (2025), VAT to 22% (2026)[6] |
| Domestic borrowing | Fast if markets trust you | Higher debt and interest; crowding out | Future taxpayers; savers if rates are held down | US and UK in the Second World War[1] |
| Foreign borrowing and aid | Depends on allies | External debt; policy conditions | Future taxpayers; donors (grants) | Ukraine: IMF-backed US$136.5bn package[5] |
| Money creation | Immediate | Inflation; loss of credibility | Holders of cash and fixed-income assets | Ukraine: NBU bond purchases of UAH 400bn in 2022[4] |
| Running down savings | Immediate | Lost buffer for future shocks | Future generations | Russia: National Wealth Fund liquid assets of 4.2 trillion roubles (2% of GDP) at end-September 2025[6] |
Inflation
Wars push up inflation from both sides: deficit spending and money creation shift AD right, while the diversion of resources to the military shifts SRAS left. Price controls can hide this for a while, but create shortages and black markets instead (see maximum and minimum prices).
Debt and crowding out
Crowding out is largest when borrowing is domestic and the economy is at full capacity: extra military output then comes straight out of civilian investment and consumption.
Financial repression
The US example is the clearest. In April 1942, at the Treasury’s request, the Federal Reserve committed to a peg of 3/8 percent on short-term Treasury bills and implicitly capped long-term Treasury bond yields at 2.5 percent. The peg survived the war. It ended only when inflation surged during the Korean War: annualised CPI inflation had reached 21 percent by February 1951, and the Treasury–Fed Accord of 4 March 1951 restored the Fed’s freedom to set rates[2].
Reinhart and Sbrancia estimate that, after the war, negative real interest rates liquidated government debt in the US and UK by an average of 3 to 4 percent of GDP a year[3]. That is the same order of magnitude as the 2.8 points in our third worked example. It is a quiet tax on savers: politically easier than an explicit tax, and less fair.
Evaluation: which method is least harmful?
Exams reward a reasoned judgement. Use these “it depends” points:
- Length of the war. For a short war, borrowing is sensible: it smooths taxes. For a long war, debt compounds, and taxes must eventually rise.
- Credibility. A government with a record of repaying can borrow cheaply. One without it drifts towards money creation.
- Spare capacity. If the economy has idle resources, deficit spending raises output more and crowds out less.
- Distribution. Taxes can be progressive; inflation and financial repression hit savers and cash holders.
A strong conclusion often says that most governments use a mix, with borrowing as the largest share, tax rises to release resources and protect credibility, and money creation only as a short bridge. See also our guide to writing economics essays with evaluation.
Where to go next
The Economics of War goes further: 20 fully referenced case studies covering output, inflation, public debt, trade, jobs and poverty, with exam-style questions. For the underlying theory, the Economics Made Simple textbook covers fiscal and monetary policy, and the Economics Made Simple Practice Questions book has 450 exam-style questions with mark schemes.
Practice questions
EasyQ1. State the government budget constraint and name the three main ways a war can be financed. Show worked answer
Spending minus taxes equals new borrowing plus new money.
The three methods: taxation (raise \(T\)), borrowing (sell bonds, \(\Delta B\)) and money creation (central bank financing, \(\Delta M\)).
EasyQ2. Explain why financing a war by money creation is described as a tax. Show worked answer
Each unit of money buys less, so holders of money lose purchasing power.
That loss is a transfer of real resources to the government: the inflation tax.
MediumQ3. War spending rises by 18% of GDP. Taxes rise by 6% of GDP and the central bank finances 3% of GDP. How much is borrowed from the public, and what share of the extra spending is tax-financed? Show worked answer
Tax share \(= 6/18 = 33.3\%\).
Borrowing share \(= 9/18 = 50\%\); money creation \(= 3/18 = 16.7\%\).
MediumQ4. Debt is 100% of GDP. The nominal interest rate is 2%, nominal GDP growth is 7% and the primary balance is zero. Find next year’s debt ratio and explain the role of the real interest rate. Show worked answer
Debt falls by 4.7 points with no surplus at all.
Because the interest rate is below nominal growth, the denominator (GDP) grows faster than the debt.
ExamQ5. “Borrowing is the best way to finance a war.” Evaluate this statement. [20 marks] Show worked answer
Knowledge (up to 5): budget constraint; define borrowing, taxation, money creation; tax smoothing.
Analysis (up to 8): spreads the cost (tax smoothing) and avoids the inflation tax; but raises debt and interest costs, crowds out investment and adds rollover risk.
Evaluation (up to 7): depends on length of war, credibility, spare capacity, availability of foreign aid; financial repression shows the cost can be hidden in negative real rates (3–4% of GDP a year in the post-war US and UK); compare Ukraine’s 2022 use of money creation as a short bridge. Reasoned conclusion: borrowing is usually the largest share, but a mix with tax rises is less damaging than borrowing alone.
Frequently asked questions
What are the three ways a government can finance a war?
Taxation, borrowing (selling government bonds at home or abroad) and money creation (the central bank buying government debt with new money). Aid and savings supplement these.
Why do governments not simply print money to pay for wars?
Because money creation causes inflation, a tax on everyone holding money. As inflation rises, people hold less money, so the government must print ever faster for the same revenue, which can end in hyperinflation.
How did the US and UK reduce their Second World War debts?
Mostly not by repaying them. Debt ratios fell because nominal GDP grew through real growth and inflation, and because interest rates were held below inflation for long periods (financial repression).
What is the difference between financial repression and the inflation tax?
The inflation tax falls on holders of money. Financial repression falls on holders of bonds and deposits, whose interest rate is held below inflation, shrinking the government’s real debt.
References
- International Monetary Fund. Historical Public Debt Database (gross public debt, % of GDP), IMF DataMapper; described in Mauro, P., Romeu, R., Binder, A. and Zaman, A. (2015) “A modern history of fiscal prudence and profligacy”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 76, 55–70. https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/d@FPP/USA/GBR
- Romero, J. (2013) “The Treasury-Fed Accord”, Federal Reserve History, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond (written as of 22 November 2013). https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/treasury-fed-accord
- Reinhart, C. M. and Sbrancia, M. B. (2015) “The liquidation of government debt”, Economic Policy, 30(82), 291–333. Working paper version: NBER Working Paper 16893 (2011). https://www.nber.org/papers/w16893
- National Bank of Ukraine (2023) “NBU Annual Report for 2022: preserving macrofinancial stability and public trust despite unprecedented wartime challenges”. https://bank.gov.ua/en/news/all/richniy-zvit-nbu-za-2022-rik-…
- International Monetary Fund (2026) “IMF Executive Board Approves US$8.1 Billion under an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Arrangement for Ukraine”, Press Release No. 26/66, 26 February 2026. https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/02/26/pr-26066-…
- Simola, H. (2025) “Russian budget framework for 2026–2028 foresees tax hikes and lots of red ink”, Bank of Finland Bulletin (blog). https://www.bofbulletin.fi/blogs/2025/russian-budget-framework-for-2026-2028-foresees-tax-hikes-and-lots-of-red-ink/

