Afghanistan, 2001–2021, and the Economy After the Aid Stopped

Most chapters in this book look at what happens to an economy when a war starts. This chapter mainly looks at what happens when a war ends, at least for the foreign powers involved. For twenty years Afghanistan’s economy was built around foreign money. Donors paid for most of the state, and foreign spending kept towns and cities busy. When the Taliban took power in August 2021, most of that money stopped almost overnight. The country lost its budget support, its access to its own central bank reserves and its links to the world’s banks, all at once. The result was one of the sharpest economic collapses of recent decades. It is a natural experiment in aid dependence: what happens when an economy that relies on outside money has it cut off.

1. Background: how the war began

Afghanistan had been at war for more than two decades before 2001. The US-led intervention that followed the attacks of 11 September 2001 removed the first Taliban government and began a twenty-year effort to build a new state.^[17] In 2001 Afghanistan’s GDP was only about $2.8bn, and real output fell by 9.4% that year.^[2][1]

What followed was not only a military campaign but a very large aid programme. Net official development assistance (ODA), meaning grants and cheap loans from foreign governments and agencies, rose from about $410m in 2001 to about $6.1bn in 2009.^[4] Measured against gross national income (GNI), aid was 31% in 2002 and peaked at about 50% in 2007.^[3] The US alone appropriated about $148.21bn for reconstruction across security forces, governance, development and counternarcotics.^[17] That figure covers reconstruction only, not the cost of military operations.^[17]

For most of the period the insurgency continued. As foreign troops left, the Afghan government lost ground. On 15 August 2021 the Taliban took control of Kabul.^[15] Donors suspended most of their aid, and the economy went into free fall.^[13]

2. Where things stand now

As of October 2026, the Taliban remain in power and the economy has stabilised at a much lower level than before 2021. The World Bank estimates that real GDP grew by about 4.8% in 2025 and expects growth of around 4% in 2026. It warns that growth could be lower because of the conflict in the Middle East.^[11][12] Growth in total output does not mean people are better off. The World Bank says GDP per person fell by 5.6%, because the population grew by around 11% in 2025 as returnees arrived.^[11]

Prices are rising again after two years of falling. Inflation averaged 3.6% and reached 7.6% by March 2026.^[11] The country imports far more than it exports. The World Bank estimates the current account deficit at 36.1% of GDP in 2025. Domestic revenue was 19.8% of GDP.^[11]

Three pressures stand out in late 2026:

• Returns. UNHCR, the UN refugee agency, recorded 1,298,370 returns to Afghanistan in 2026 up to 3 October: 715,400 from Pakistan and 581,600 from Iran. This followed about 2.9 million returns in 2025.^[23][24]
• Conflict with Pakistan. Fighting broke out in October 2025 and Pakistan closed the crossings on 12 October.^[25] Since late February 2026 Pakistan has carried out air strikes in several provinces, and trade routes between the two countries have stayed shut. UNAMA, the UN mission, reported between 75 and 212 Afghan civilians killed from late February onward.^[27]
• Falling aid. The 2026 humanitarian plan asked for $1.7bn. By early June only 16% had been funded, while about 22 million people, half the population, needed humanitarian help.^[28]

Girls remain barred from secondary school. UNICEF and UNESCO said in January 2026 that about 2.2 million adolescent girls were affected.^[16] No country had released the frozen reserves held in the Afghan Fund, and the fund had not paid out any money as of January 2025.^[20]

3. The economy before the war

It helps to separate two “before” periods. The first is 2001, when the economy was tiny and broken after decades of conflict. The second is 2020, just before the takeover. This chapter treats 2020 as the main baseline, because the economic shock came when the aid stopped in 2021.

Fast growth on aid, 2002–2012. Real GDP grew by 28.6% in 2002, 13.8% in 2007, 21.4% in 2009 and 12.8% in 2012.^[1] GDP in current dollars rose from about $3.8bn in 2002 to about $19.9bn in 2012.^[2] Much of this growth came from aid and foreign military spending. These funded construction, transport, security services and government wages.

Slowdown after 2014. As foreign troops were drawn down, growth slowed sharply. From 2014 to 2019 it ranged between 1.2% and 3.9% a year.^[1] Population, meanwhile, grew by about 2–3% a year, from 32.8 million in 2014 to 37.9 million in 2019.^[9] So income per person was flat or falling. In constant 2015 dollars, GDP per person was about $575 in 2014 and about $558 in 2019.^[6]

A state paid for by others. By 2018–2020, total aid averaged about $8.4bn a year, around 45% of GDP.^[10] UNDP says that at the 2021 transition, aid made up 75% of total government spending and nearly 40% of GDP.^[13] (The two estimates differ slightly because they measure aid in different ways.) Net ODA alone was about 21% of GNI in 2019 and 2020.^[3] This is extremely high by world standards.

Some real gains. The aid years did bring progress in human capital. Female gross secondary school enrolment rose from about 7% in 2003 to about 41% in 2018.^[8] The ILO’s modelled estimate of the female labour force participation rate rose from about 14% in the early 2000s to about 21% in 2017.^[7]

The opium economy. Alongside the formal economy sat a large illegal one. In 2022, the last year before the ban took effect, poppy was grown on about 233,000 hectares and farmers earned about $1.36bn from opium.^[21] The World Bank later put the loss to farmers from the ban at about $1.3bn, or around 8% of GDP.^[10]

4. The economic impact: indicator by indicator

4.1 Output and GDP

The fall in output after August 2021 was one of the largest in the world in recent decades. The World Bank estimates that real GDP fell by 20.7% in 2021 and by 6.2% in 2022, a cumulative fall of about 26%.^[10] Sources differ on the size of the 2021 fall: the IMF’s database puts it at 14.5%, with a further 6.2% fall in 2022.^[30] Measured in current dollars, GDP fell from about $20.0bn in 2020 to about $14.3bn in 2021.^[2] In late 2021 UNDP had projected a fall of about 20% in nominal GDP, and warned that it could reach 30% without corrective action.^[14]

Recovery has been slow. Growth was 2.3% in 2023 and 1.9% in 2024, according to the World Bank’s data.^[1] The 2025 estimate of about 4.8% is stronger, but much of it reflects more people, not higher productivity.^[11][12]

The fall looks even worse per person. In constant 2015 dollars, GDP per person fell from about $558 in 2019 to about $409 in 2021 and about $374 in 2024.^[6] That is a fall of about a third in five years. UNDP said in 2022 that Afghanistan was reversing “in 12 months what had taken 10 years to accumulate”.^[13]

4.2 Aid: the cliff

The central event was the “aid cliff”. Before the takeover, about $8.4bn a year of aid flowed in. In 2022, off-budget transfers (mainly UN humanitarian money that bypasses the government) were about $3.7bn, or roughly 26% of GDP.^[10] On-budget aid, which paid for teachers, doctors and civil servants, largely stopped.^[13] Total public spending in 2022 was about 35% lower than the 2018–2020 average.^[10]

The World Bank’s data show net ODA of about $4.7bn in 2021, $3.9bn in 2022 and $3.1bn in 2023.^[4] As a share of GNI, it was about 33% in 2021, 27% in 2022 and 18% in 2023.^[3] The 2021 ratio rose partly because GNI itself collapsed. Aid is still large relative to the economy, but it now goes mainly to emergency relief rather than to building a state.

Humanitarian money has also been shrinking. The 2026 humanitarian response plan asked for $1.7bn but had received only about $269m, or 16%, by early June 2026.^[28] UNHCR’s 2026 appeal for returnees was only 8% funded in February.^[24]

4.3 Inflation, the afghani and the money supply

Afghanistan’s currency, the afghani, had been weakening slowly before 2021. The official rate moved from about 61 afghanis per dollar in 2015 to about 78 in 2019.^[29]

After the takeover, the central bank, Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), could not use its reserves held abroad. About $9bn was frozen, roughly $7bn in the US and about $2bn in Europe.^[18] Without these reserves the bank could not defend the currency in the normal way. Inflation rose to 13.7% in 2022.^[5]

Then something unusual happened: prices began to fall. Deflation started in April 2023, and headline inflation was −9.7% year on year in February 2024.^[10] The afghani rose by about 27% against the dollar in 2023 (the World Bank report also gives a figure of 26%).^[10] Two forces explain this. First, the UN shipped about $1.8bn in cash dollars into the country in 2023 to pay for aid, and remittances brought in about $2bn.^[10] Second, the money supply (M2) shrank by nearly 11% between late 2020 and mid-2023, and demand was weak.^[10] Annual inflation was −4.6% in 2023 and −6.6% in 2024.^[5] By early 2026 prices were rising again.^[11]

4.4 Public finances

Before 2021 the Afghan state could spend far more than it raised, because donors filled the gap. After the takeover, the government had to live mainly on its own revenue. The Taliban authorities did raise revenue: in the 2023 fiscal year, domestic revenue was about 210.7 billion afghanis, 9% more than the year before. About half came from customs duties.^[10] By 2025 revenue was about 19.8% of GDP.^[11] But revenue alone cannot replace aid that was once around 45% of GDP.^[10] The result was a smaller state. Public spending fell by about 35% in 2022 compared with 2018–2020.^[10]

The frozen reserves are a separate fiscal and monetary issue. In September 2022 the US set aside $3.5bn of the frozen money for a Swiss-based “Afghan Fund”, with an account at the Bank for International Settlements. The fund was meant to pay for things like electricity imports and arrears to international lenders, not humanitarian aid. The other $3.5bn held in the US was kept back because of legal claims by families of 11 September victims.^[19] The Taliban foreign ministry called the plan “unacceptable”.^[19] By January 2025 the fund had grown to about $3.9bn but had not disbursed anything. Reasons included non-recognition of the Taliban, a unanimous board rule and disputes over who leads the central bank.^[20]

4.5 Trade and key sectors

Afghanistan imports much more than it exports. In 2023 exports were about $1.9bn and imports about $7.8bn. Food was the largest export at about $1.25bn, while coal exports fell by 46% to $257m.^[10] The World Bank estimated the 2023 trade deficit at $5.9bn as recorded, or about $3.6bn after adjusting for goods passing through to Pakistan.^[10]

Trade routes have shifted sharply since 2025. The conflict with Pakistan closed the main crossings. Before the closure, two-way trade was about $2–3bn a year.^[25] Pakistani customs data show that Afghan transit containers through Pakistan fell from 102,886 (worth $6.7bn) in Pakistan’s 2023 fiscal year to 11,592 (worth $367m) in fiscal 2026. Afghan exports through Pakistan to third countries fell from $454m to $7m.^[26] Iran has become more important: the World Bank says that direct imports from Iran and imports passing through Iran made up 48.6% of Afghanistan’s imports in fiscal 2025.^[26] The effect has been felt on both sides of the border. Pakistan lost nearly $850m in exports and transit revenue, according to a report cited by Afghanistan International.^[27]

4.6 The opium economy

The 2022 poppy ban was the largest single supply shock in the rural economy. According to UNODC, the UN drugs agency, cultivation fell by about 95%, from 233,000 hectares in 2022 to 10,800 hectares in 2023. Opium production fell from 6,200 tonnes to 333 tonnes.^[21] Farmers’ income from opium fell from about $1.36bn to $110m.^[21] The World Bank estimated that about 450,000 farm jobs were lost and that about 200,000 hectares were switched to food crops.^[10]

The ban has largely held. UNODC’s 2025 survey found 10,200 hectares under poppy, 20% less than the 12,800 hectares of 2024. Production was 296 tonnes, 32% less than in 2024. Because supply is so scarce, the farm-gate price of dry opium was still about five times the pre-ban average, at $570 a kilogram. Farmers’ total income from opium was about $134m in 2025, down from $260m in 2024.^[22] (Note that UNODC’s 2025 report gives the 2022 area as 232,000 hectares, slightly different from the 233,000 in its 2023 report.^[22][21])

4.7 Labour market

Jobs disappeared quickly after 2021. UNDP estimated that nearly 700,000 jobs were lost in the first year.^[13] The World Bank reported in 2024 that employment was still 58% below its pre-August 2021 level, though this refers to its own survey measure.^[10] The opium ban removed about 450,000 farm jobs.^[10]

The biggest change was for women. The ILO’s modelled estimate of female labour force participation fell from about 14.6% in 2021 to about 5.2% in 2022, and has stayed near 5% since.^[7] The World Bank found that the share of firms with no female employees rose to 50%, and that most of the firms that closed were owned by women.^[10] In December 2021 UNDP estimated that restricting women’s employment could cause an immediate economic loss of up to $1bn, or up to 5% of GDP.^[14]

4.8 Poverty, human development and human capital

In September 2021 UNDP warned that up to 97% of the population could fall below the poverty line.^[14] By 2024 the World Bank said that about half the population was in poverty and about 15 million people faced food insecurity.^[10] UNDP found the cost of a basic food basket rose by 35% in the first year.^[13] Child malnutrition rose sharply: UNICEF reported that admissions for severe acute malnutrition rose from 30,000 in June 2021 to 57,000 in June 2022.^[15]

The education ban is the deepest long-term cost. UNICEF estimated in 2022 that keeping girls out of secondary school cost Afghanistan 2.5% of its annual GDP, at least $500m in a year. It also estimated that if the current cohort of three million girls finished secondary school and joined the labour market, they would add at least $5.4bn to the economy.^[15] As of January 2026, about 2.2 million adolescent girls were still barred.^[16] Human capital that is not built now cannot easily be made up later.

4.9 Special indicator: returnees

Since October 2023, large numbers of Afghans have returned from Iran and Pakistan. UNHCR counted about 5.4 million returns by early 2026, including 2.9 million in 2025.^[24] A UNHCR survey found that more than 90% of returnees lived on less than $5 a day.^[24] The World Bank says these returns pushed population growth to around 11% in 2025, which is why GDP per person fell even though GDP grew.^[11] Returns also cut remittances from relatives working abroad, which had been worth about $2bn in 2023.^[10]

5. What went well and what went wrong

What went well (from an economic-policy perspective)

• Human capital grew in the aid years. Girls’ secondary enrolment rose from about 7% to about 41% between 2003 and 2018.^[8]
• After the collapse, UN cash shipments of about $1.8bn in 2023 kept dollars flowing, helped stabilise the afghani and kept basic goods affordable.^[10]
• Domestic revenue held up. Customs and inland revenue grew in 2023, and revenue reached about 19.8% of GDP in 2025.^[10][11]
• Prices fell in 2023–24, which helped poor households buy food.^[5][10]
• About 200,000 hectares formerly under poppy were switched to food crops.^[10]

What went wrong

• Growth relied on outside money. When aid of about 45% of GDP stopped, there was no domestic base to replace it.^[10]
• Growth stalled after 2014, well before the takeover, as foreign spending fell.^[1]
• Freezing about $9bn of reserves left the central bank unable to act as a normal central bank.^[18] The $3.5bn Afghan Fund has paid nothing out.^[20]
• The opium ban cut about $1.3bn of farm income, around 8% of GDP, with no large replacement income for rural households.^[10]
• Bans on women’s work and girls’ education removed a large share of potential workers and cut future productivity.^[14][15]
• Mass returns and the closure of the Pakistan border added new shocks just as the economy was starting to grow again.^[24][26]

6. The economics behind it

Aid as an injection into aggregate demand. In the circular flow, aid is an injection like exports. When it is spent on wages, construction and services, it raises aggregate demand (AD) and, through the multiplier, raises national income. When it stops, the multiplier works in reverse. Spending by the state falls, the people it paid spend less, and so on. With aid at about 45% of GDP, the leftward shift in AD after August 2021 was enormous.^[10]

Dutch disease and the “aid economy”. Large inflows of foreign currency can raise the real exchange rate and pull workers into non-traded services, such as construction, security and services for foreign agencies. This makes farming and manufacturing less competitive. This is sometimes called “Dutch disease”. Afghanistan’s export base stayed small: even in 2023, exports were only about a quarter of imports.^[10] When the inflows stopped, the economy had few tradable sectors to fall back on.

Sanctions on a central bank. A central bank needs foreign reserves to pay for imports, to settle with foreign banks and to manage the currency. Freezing reserves is a financial sanction. It weakens the target state, but it also hurts private firms and households, who cannot pay for imports or receive money from abroad. The trade-off between pressure on a government and harm to civilians is a common theme in the economics of sanctions.

The opium ban as a negative supply shock. Opium was a high-value cash crop. Banning it shifted rural incomes down sharply. Simple supply and demand also explains the price change: when supply falls and demand is inelastic, the price rises steeply. Farm-gate prices stayed about five times the pre-ban average in 2025.^[22] This also raises the reward for those who keep growing, which is why enforcement matters.

Population and income per head. GDP per person equals GDP divided by population. If GDP grows by 4.8% and population grows by around 11%, GDP per person must fall.^[11] This is a simple but important point for exam answers about “growth”.

7. Outlook and the way forward

The World Bank projects growth of about 4% in 2026, with risks on the downside from the conflict in the Middle East.^[11][12] Several scenarios are possible.

• Low-growth stability (baseline). The economy grows a little each year, but faster population growth keeps income per person falling. Aid keeps shrinking. This is roughly the World Bank’s current picture.^[11]
• Deeper stress. More returns, a long closure of the Pakistan border and further aid cuts combine. Remittances fall, imports become more expensive and food insecurity rises. With the 2026 humanitarian appeal only 16% funded in June, this risk is real.^[28][26]
• Gradual reconnection. Partial release of reserves, new trade routes through Iran and Central Asia, and some return of development aid. The World Bank notes that Central Asian routes are gaining importance.^[26]

The main long-term risks are human capital and jobs. Every year that girls are out of school reduces the future workforce. Every year that returnees cannot find work adds to poverty. The economy also needs more exports to pay for imports, since the current account deficit is around 36% of GDP.^[11]

8. Exam-style questions

Glossary

• Aid cliff: a sudden, large fall in foreign aid to a country that depends on it.
• Aid dependence: a situation in which foreign grants finance a large share of public spending or total demand.
• Current account deficit: when a country pays more to the rest of the world for imports and income than it receives.
• Deflation: a sustained fall in the general price level.
• Dutch disease: when large foreign currency inflows raise the real exchange rate and make other traded sectors less competitive.
• Farm-gate price: the price a farmer receives for a crop at the farm, before transport and trading.
• Foreign exchange reserves: foreign currency and assets held by a central bank to pay for imports and manage the currency.
• Gross national income (GNI): GDP plus net income from abroad.
• Human capital: the skills, education and health of workers that raise their productivity.
• Off-budget aid: aid spent directly by donors or the UN without passing through the government’s budget.
• Official development assistance (ODA): grants and concessional loans from foreign governments and agencies to promote development.
• Remittances: money sent home by people working abroad.

References

1. World Bank (2026). “GDP growth (annual %) – Afghanistan (NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG)”. World Development Indicators, accessed 14 October 2026. https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/AFG/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?format=json&date=2000:2025
2. World Bank (2026). “GDP (current US$) – Afghanistan (NY.GDP.MKTP.CD)”. World Development Indicators, accessed 14 October 2026. https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/AFG/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?format=json&date=2000:2025
3. World Bank (2026). “Net ODA received (% of GNI) – Afghanistan (DT.ODA.ODAT.GN.ZS)”. World Development Indicators, accessed 14 October 2026. https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/AFG/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.GN.ZS?format=json&date=2000:2025
4. World Bank (2026). “Net official development assistance received (current US$) – Afghanistan (DT.ODA.ODAT.CD)”. World Development Indicators, accessed 14 October 2026. https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/AFG/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.CD?format=json&date=2000:2025
5. World Bank (2026). “Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) – Afghanistan (FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG)”. World Development Indicators, accessed 14 October 2026. https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/AFG/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?format=json&date=2000:2025
6. World Bank (2026). “GDP per capita (constant 2015 US$) – Afghanistan (NY.GDP.PCAP.KD)”. World Development Indicators, accessed 14 October 2026. https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/AFG/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD?format=json&date=2000:2025
7. World Bank / ILO (2026). “Labor force participation rate, female (% of female population ages 15+) (modeled ILO estimate) – Afghanistan (SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS)”. World Development Indicators, accessed 14 October 2026. https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/AFG/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS?format=json&date=2000:2025
8. World Bank (2026). “School enrollment, secondary, female (% gross) – Afghanistan (SE.SEC.ENRR.FE)”. World Development Indicators, accessed 14 October 2026. https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/AFG/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR.FE?format=json&date=2000:2025
9. World Bank (2026). “Population, total – Afghanistan (SP.POP.TOTL)”. World Development Indicators, accessed 14 October 2026. https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/AFG/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?format=json&date=2000:2025
10. World Bank (2024). “Afghanistan Development Update, April 2024”. World Bank, April 2024. https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/18a1ccff0457effb0a456c0d4af7cce2-0310012024/original/Afghanistan-Development-Update-April-2024.pdf
11. World Bank (2026). “Afghanistan’s Economy Shows Resilience but Living Standards are Falling”. Press release, 26 May 2026. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2026/05/26/afghanistan-s-economy-shows-resilience-but-living-standards-are-falling
12. Pajhwok Afghan News (2026). “World Bank projects 4pc growth for Afghanistan’s economy in 2026”. 27 April 2026. https://pajhwok.com/2026/04/27/world-bank-projects-4pc-growth-for-afghanistans-economy-in-2026/
13. UN News (2022). “Ten years of Afghan economic growth, reversed in just 12 months: UNDP”. 5 October 2022. https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/10/1129287
14. UNDP (2021). “Restrictions on women’s employment can reduce Afghanistan’s GDP by an additional 5 percent, UNDP report finds”. Press release, 1 December 2021. https://www.undp.org/press-releases/restrictions-womens-employment-can-reduce-afghanistans-gdp-additional-5-percent-undp-report-finds
15. UNICEF (2022). “Depriving girls of secondary education translates to a loss of at least US$500 million to Afghan economy”. Press release, 15 August 2022. https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/depriving-girls-secondary-education-translates-loss-least-us500-million-afghan
16. KabulNow (2026). “Taliban ban keeps 2.2 million Afghan girls out of secondary school, UN agencies say” (on UNICEF–UNESCO joint statement). 24 January 2026. https://kabulnow.com/2026/01/taliban-ban-keeps-2-2-million-afghan-girls-out-of-secondary-school-un-agencies-say/
17. Homeland Security Today (2025). “SIGAR issues final report on two decades of U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan”. December 2025. https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/counterterrorism/sigar-issues-final-report-on-two-decades-of-u-s-reconstruction-efforts-in-afghanistan/
18. NPR (2022). “Afghanistan’s frozen central bank reserves” (transcript). 2022. https://www.npr.org/transcripts/1126056018
19. CBS News (2022). “U.S. sets up $3.5 billion fund to aid Afghanistan using frozen bank reserves”. 15 September 2022. https://www.cbsnews.com/amp/news/afghan-fund-us-aid-afghanistan-under-taliban
20. Swissinfo (2025). “Why Afghanistan’s reserves are stuck in Switzerland”. 16 January 2025. https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/swiss-diplomacy/why-afghanistans-reserves-are-stuck-in-switzerland/88698920
21. UN News (2023). “Opium cultivation declines by 95 per cent in Afghanistan: UN survey” (on UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2023). 5 November 2023. https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/11/1143232
22. UNODC (2025). “Afghanistan opium cultivation falls in 2025, shifting regional production and trafficking patterns, says new UNODC survey” (Afghanistan Opium Survey 2025). ReliefWeb, 6 November 2025. https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-opium-survey-2025-november-2025-endarips-0
23. UNHCR (2026). “Afghanistan situation: returns to Afghanistan in 2026” (operational data portal, data as of 3 October 2026). https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/afghanistan/location
24. The New Arab / AFP (2026). “150,000 Afghans have returned from Pakistan, Iran this year: UN”. 14 February 2026. https://www.newarab.com/news/150000-afghans-have-returned-pakistan-iran-year-un
25. RFE/RL, republished by OilPrice.com (2025). “Pakistan-Afghanistan feud freezes $3 billion in annual bilateral trade”. 30 December 2025. https://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/International/Pakistan-Afghanistan-Fued-Freezes-3-Billion-in-Annual-Bilateral-Trade.amp.html
26. IANS (2026). “Afghanistan’s new trade routes leave Pakistan’s border economy reeling” (citing Dawn and the World Bank Afghanistan Economic Monitor). 25 August 2026. https://ianslive.in/afghanistans-new-trade-routes-leave-pakistans-border-economy-reeling–20260825144348
27. Afghanistan International (2026). “Pakistan-Taliban tensions cost trade sector $850 million”. 3 June 2026. https://www.afintl.com/en/202606038496
28. KabulNow (2026). “UN warns funding shortfall threatens life-saving aid for millions in Afghanistan” (citing OCHA). 2 June 2026. https://kabulnow.com/2026/06/un-warns-funding-shortfall-threatens-life-saving-aid-for-millions-in-afghanistan/
29. World Bank (2026). “Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, period average) – Afghanistan (PA.NUS.FCRF)”. World Development Indicators, accessed 14 October 2026. https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/AFG/indicator/PA.NUS.FCRF?format=json&date=2000:2025
30. IMF (2026). “World Economic Outlook database: real GDP growth – Afghanistan” (IMF DataMapper, accessed 14 October 2026). https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/api/v1/NGDP_RPCH/AFG

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